Related papers: Matching in Closed-Form: Equilibrium, Identificati…
Stochastic dynamic matching problems have recently gained attention in the stochastic-modeling community due to their diverse applications, such as supply-chain management and kidney exchange programs. In this paper, we study a matching…
In this communication, the derivation of the Boltzmann-Gibbs and the Maxwellian distributions is presented from a geometrical point of view under the hypothesis of equiprobability. It is shown that both distributions can be obtained by…
A system of two cubic reaction-diffusion equations for two independent gene frequencies arising in population dynamics is studied. Depending on values of coefficients, all possible Lie and $Q$-conditional (nonclassical) symmetries are…
Articles in Marketing and choice literatures have demonstrated the need for incorporating person-level heterogeneity into behavioral models (e.g., logit models for multiple binary outcomes as studied here). However, the logit likelihood…
We obtain a perfect sampling characterization of weak ergodicity for backward products of finite stochastic matrices, and equivalently, simultaneous tail triviality of the corresponding nonhomogeneous Markov chains. Applying these ideas to…
Applications such as employees sharing office spaces over a workweek can be modeled as problems where agents are matched to resources over multiple rounds. Agents' requirements limit the set of compatible resources and the rounds in which…
Variational inequalities are an important tool, which includes minimization, saddles, games, fixed-point problems. Modern large-scale and computationally expensive practical applications make distributed methods for solving these problems…
We study the implementability of stable matchings in a two-sided market model with one-sided incomplete information. Firms' types are publicly known, whereas workers' types are private information. A mechanism generates a matching and…
The problem of demand inversion - a crucial step in the estimation of random utility discrete-choice models - is equivalent to the determination of stable outcomes in two-sided matching models. This equivalence applies to random utility…
Finite mixture of skew distributions have emerged as an effective tool in modelling heterogeneous data with asymmetric features. With various proposals appearing rapidly in the recent years, which are similar but not identical, the…
Skew-symmetric forms possess unique capabilities. The properties of closed exterior and dual forms, namely, invariance, covariance, conjugacy and duality, either explicitly or implicitly appear in all invariant mathematical formalisms. This…
We present a general analysis of multidimensional matching problems with transferable utility, paying particular attention to the case in which the dimensions of heterogeneity on the two sides of the market are unequal. A particular…
We present a general framework for matching with transferable utility (TU) that accommodates arbitrary heterogeneity without relying on the logit structure. The optimal assignment problem is characterized by tractable linear programming…
We study the two-sided stable matching problem with one-sided uncertainty for two sets of agents A and B, with equal cardinality. Initially, the preference lists of the agents in A are given but the preferences of the agents in B are…
In this paper, we address the problem of estimating transport surplus (a.k.a. matching affinity) in high dimensional optimal transport problems. Classical optimal transport theory specifies the matching affinity and determines the optimal…
We study partial identification of the preference parameters in the one-to-one matching model with perfectly transferable utilities. We do so without imposing parametric distributional assumptions on the unobserved heterogeneity and with…
We introduce a model of dynamic matching with transferable utility, extending the static model of Shapley and Shubik (1971). Forward-looking agents have individual states that evolve with current matches. Each period, a matching market with…
We consider a learning problem for the stable marriage model under unknown preferences for the left side of the market. We focus on the centralized case, where at each time step, an online platform matches the agents, and obtains a noisy…
Stable matching is a fundamental problem studied both in economics and computer science. The task is to find a matching between two sides of agents that have preferences over who they want to be matched with. A matching is stable if no pair…
We consider methods for aggregating preferences that are based on the resolution of discrete optimization problems. The preferences are represented by arbitrary binary relations (possibly weighted) or incomplete paired comparison matrices.…