Related papers: Evolution of populations with strategy-dependent t…
Game theory ideas provide a useful framework for studying evolutionary dynamics in a well-mixed environment. This approach, however, typically enforces a strictly fixed overall population size, deemphasizing natural growth processes. We…
Dynamics of evolutionary games strongly depend on underlying networks. We study the coevolutionary prisoner's dilemma in which players change their local networks as well as strategies (i.e., cooperate or defect). This topic has been…
We study the evolution of cooperation in the spatial prisoner's dilemma game where players are allowed to establish new interactions with others. By employing a simple coevolutionary rule entailing only two crucial parameters, we find that…
As artificial intelligence (AI) systems are increasingly embedded in our lives, their presence leads to interactions that shape our behaviour, decision-making, and social interactions. Existing theoretical research has primarily focused on…
We considered a three-strategy game with the characteristics of the prisoner's dilemma and stag hunt games. This game was inspired by recent experimental studies that elucidated the role of individual solutions. People who adopt individual…
In the optional prisoner's dilemma (OPD), players can choose to cooperate and defect as usual, but can also abstain as a third possible strategy. This strategy models the players' participation in the game and is a relevant aspect in many…
We study a multi-agent decision problem in population games, where agents select from multiple available strategies and continually revise their selections based on the payoffs associated with these strategies. Unlike conventional…
Cooperation lies at the foundations of human societies, yet why people cooperate remains a conundrum. The issue, known as network reciprocity, of whether population structure can foster cooperative behavior in social dilemmas has been…
In the evolutionary minority game, agents are allowed to evolve their strategies (``mutate'') based on past experience. We explore the dependence of the system's global behavior on the response time and the mutation threshold of the agents.…
We address the problem of how the survival of cooperation in a social system depends on the motion of the individuals. Specifically, we study a model in which Prisoner's Dilemma players are allowed to move in a two-dimensional plane. Our…
We analyse the strategy equilibrium of dilemma games considering a payoff matrix affected by small and random perturbations on the off-diagonal. Notably, a recent work [1] reported that, while cooperation is sustained by perturbations…
We study a dynamic game with a large population of players who choose actions from a finite set in continuous time. Each player has a state in a finite state space that evolves stochastically with their actions. A player's reward depends…
Cooperation underlies many natural and artificial systems. While voluntary participation can sustain cooperation without informational assumptions, real interactions are rarely anonymous, leaving the joint effects of participation and…
We introduce and study a mean-field model for a system of spatially distributed players interacting through an evolutionary game driven by a replicator dynamics. Strategies evolve by a replicator dynamics influenced by the position and the…
We study an atomic signaling game under stochastic evolutionary dynamics. There is a finite number of players who repeatedly update from a finite number of available languages/signaling strategies. Players imitate the most fit agents with…
We consider a broad class of stochastic imitation dynamics over networks, encompassing several well known learning models such as the replicator dynamics. In the considered models, players have no global information about the game…
We study a model of binary decisions in a fully connected network of interacting agents. Individual decisions are determined by social influence, coming from direct interactions with neighbours, and a group level pressure that accounts for…
In this work we study a weak Prisoner\^as Dilemma game in which both strategies and update rules are subjected to evolutionary pressure. Interactions among agents are specified by complex topologies, and we consider both homogeneous and…
Evolutionary game dynamics in finite populations is typically subject to noise, inducing effects which are not present in deterministic systems, including fixation and extinction. In the first part of this paper we investigate the…
Synchronization, cooperation, and chaos are ubiquitous phenomena in nature. In a population composed of many distinct groups of individuals playing the prisoner's dilemma game, there exists a migration dilemma: No cooperator would migrate…