Related papers: Reward Design in Risk-Taking Contests
We investigate a randomization procedure undertaken in real option games which can serve as a basic model of regulation in a duopoly model of preemptive investment. We recall the rigorous framework of [M. Grasselli, V. Lecl\`ere and M.…
This paper characterizes optimal classification when individuals adjust their behavior in response to the classification rule. We model the interaction between a designer and a population as a Stackelberg game: the designer selects a…
This paper studies the equilibrium behavior in contests with stochastic progress. Participants have access to a safe action that makes progress deterministically, but they can also take risky moves that stochastically influence their…
We analyze a mean field tournament: a mean field game in which the agents receive rewards according to the ranking of the terminal value of their projects and are subject to cost of effort. Using Schr\"{o}dinger bridges we are able to…
Winners-take-all situations introduce an incentive for agents to diversify their behavior, since doing so will result in splitting an eventual price with fewer people. At the same time, when the payoff of a process depends on a parameter…
Incentives play an important role in (security and IT) risk management of a large-scale organization with multiple autonomous divisions. This paper presents an incentive mechanism design framework for risk management based on a…
We develop the linear programming approach to mean-field games in a general setting. This relaxed control approach allows to prove existence results under weak assumptions, and lends itself well to numerical implementation. We consider…
In a continuous-time setting where a risk-averse agent controls the drift of an output process driven by a Brownian motion, optimal contracts are linear in the terminal output; this result is well-known in a setting with moral hazard and…
This paper studies a sequential decision problem where payoff distributions are known and where the riskiness of payoffs matters. Equivalently, it studies sequential choice from a repeated set of independent lotteries. The decision-maker is…
In this paper, we study the well-known team orienteering problem where a fleet of robots collects rewards by visiting locations. Usually, the rewards are assumed to be known to the robots; however, in applications such as environmental…
In reinforcement learning episodes, the rewards and punishments are often non-deterministic, and there are invariably stochastic elements governing the underlying situation. Such stochastic elements are often numerous and cannot be known in…
Reinforcement Learning (RL) is a computational approach to reward-driven learning in sequential decision problems. It implements the discovery of optimal actions by learning from an agent interacting with an environment rather than from…
We construct a Bayesian sequential test of two simple hypotheses about the value of the unobservable drift coefficient of a Brownian motion, with a possibility to change the initial decision at subsequent moments of time for some penalty.…
We introduce a model of sender-receiver stopping games, where the state of the world follows an iid--process throughout the game. At each period, the sender observes the current state, and sends a message to the receiver, suggesting either…
We consider the problem of sequential evaluation, in which an evaluator observes candidates in a sequence and assigns scores to these candidates in an online, irrevocable fashion. Motivated by the psychology literature that has studied…
Questions in causality, control, and reinforcement learning go beyond the classical machine learning task of prediction under i.i.d. observations. Instead, these fields consider the problem of learning how to actively perturb a system to…
We consider a repeated sequential game between a learner, who plays first, and an opponent who responds to the chosen action. We seek to design strategies for the learner to successfully interact with the opponent. While most previous…
Learning-based approaches for solving large sequential decision making problems have become popular in recent years. The resulting agents perform differently and their characteristics depend on those of the underlying learning approach.…
Starting from a heuristic learning scheme for N-person games, we derive a new class of continuous-time learning dynamics consisting of a replicator-like drift adjusted by a penalty term that renders the boundary of the game's strategy space…
Crowdsourcing has emerged as a paradigm for leveraging human intelligence and activity to solve a wide range of tasks. However, strategic workers will find enticement in their self-interest to free-ride and attack in a crowdsourcing contest…