Related papers: A General Framework for the Logical Representation…

We consider the problem of designing truthful auctions, when the bidders' valuations have a public and a private component. In particular, we consider combinatorial auctions where the valuation of an agent $i$ for a set $S$ of items can be…

We analyse the expressiveness of the two-valued semantics of abstract argumentation frameworks, normal logic programs and abstract dialectical frameworks. By expressiveness we mean the ability to encode a desired set of two-valued…

Auctions are markets with strict regulations governing the information available to traders in the market and the possible actions they can take. Since well designed auctions achieve desirable economic outcomes, they have been widely used…

Combinatorial contracts are emerging as a key paradigm in algorithmic contract design, paralleling the role of combinatorial auctions in algorithmic mechanism design. In this paper we study natural combinatorial contract settings involving…

We study the design of mechanisms in combinatorial auction domains. We focus on settings where the auction is repeated, motivated by auctions for licenses or advertising space. We consider models of agent behaviour in which they either…

Combining models in appropriate ways to achieve high performance is commonly seen in machine learning fields today. Although a large amount of combinatorial models have been created, little attention is drawn to the commons in different…

In the paper, frameworks for electronic shopping of composite (modular) products are described: (a) multicriteria selection (product is considered as a whole system, it is a traditional approach), (b) combinatorial synthesis (composition)…

We present a novel framework designed to extend model reconciliation approaches, commonly used in human-aware planning, for enhanced human-AI interaction. By adopting a structured argumentation-based dialogue paradigm, our framework enables…

Building rules on top of ontologies is the ultimate goal of the logical layer of the Semantic Web. To this aim an ad-hoc mark-up language for this layer is currently under discussion. It is intended to follow the tradition of hybrid…

Algorithms increasingly automate bidding in online auctions, raising concerns about tacit bid suppression and revenue shortfalls. Prior work identifies individual mechanisms behind algorithmic bid suppression, but it remains unclear which…

We study the efficiency of simple combinatorial auctions for the allocation of a set of items to a set of agents, with private subadditive valuation functions and budget constraints. The class we consider includes all auctions that allocate…

How do we assign value to economic transactions? To answer this question, we must consider whether the value of objects is inherent, is a product of social interaction, or involves other mechanisms. Economic theory predicts that there is an…

We study the communication complexity of combinatorial auctions via interpolation mechanisms that interpolate between non-truthful and truthful protocols. Specifically, an interpolation mechanism has two phases. In the first phase, the…

This paper unifies two foundational constructs from economics and algorithmic game theory, the Arctic Auction and the linear Fisher market, to address the efficient allocation of differentiated goods in complex markets. Our main…

In this paper we introduce a Conditional Answer Set Programming framework (Conditional ASP) for the definition of conditional extensions of Answer Set Programming (ASP). The approach builds on a conditional logic with typicality, and on the…

We consider a single buyer with a combinatorial preference that would like to purchase related products and services from different vendors, where each vendor supplies exactly one product. We study the general case where subsets of products…

In a combinatorial exchange setting, players place sell (resp. buy) bids on combinations of traded goods. Besides the question of finding an optimal selection of winning bids, the question of how to share the obtained profit is of high…

We try to bring to light some combinatorial structure underlying formal proofs in logic. We do this through the study of the Craig Interpolation Theorem which is properly a statement about the structure of formal derivations. We show that…

Cyber defense operations increasingly require long-term strategic planning under uncertainty and resource constraints. We propose a new use of combinatorial auctions for allocating defensive action bundles in a realistic cyber environment,…

The competitive auction was first proposed by Goldberg, Hartline, and Wright. In their paper, they introduce the competitive analysis framework of online algorithm designing into the traditional revenue-maximizing auction design problem.…