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Many allocation problems in multiagent systems rely on agents specifying cardinal preferences. However, allocation mechanisms can be sensitive to small perturbations in cardinal preferences, thus causing agents who make ``small" or…

In cooperative game theory, the primary focus is the equitable allocation of payoffs or costs among agents. However, in the practical applications of cooperative games, accurately representing games is challenging. In such cases, using an…

Allocating indivisible items among a set of agents is a frequently studied discrete optimization problem. In the setting considered in this work, the agents' preferences over the items are assumed to be identical. We consider a very recent…

We prove existence of envy-free allocations in markets with heterogenous indivisible goods and money, when a given quantity is supplied from each of the goods and agents have unit demands. We depart from most of the previous literature by…

We introduce partitioned matching games as a suitable model for international kidney exchange programmes, where in each round the total number of available kidney transplants needs to be distributed amongst the participating countries in a…

Addressing issues of social diversity, we introduce a model of housing transactions between agents who are heterogeneous in their willingness to pay. A key assumption is that agents' preferences for a location depend on both an intrinsic…

We consider the fair division of indivisible items among $n$ agents with additive non-negative normalized valuations, with the goal of obtaining high value guarantees, that is, close to the proportional share for each agent. We prove that…

We study the fair and truthful allocation of m divisible public items among n agents, each with distinct preferences for the items. To aggregate agents' preferences fairly, we focus on finding a core solution. For divisible items, a core…

We study the problem of allocating indivisible goods among agents with additive valuation functions to achieve both fairness and efficiency under the constraint that each agent receives exactly the same number of goods (the \emph{balanced…

Assignment markets involve matching with transfers, as in labor markets and housing markets. We consider a two-sided assignment market with agent types and stochastic structure similar to models used in empirical studies, and characterize…

We investigate mechanism design without payments when agents have different types of preferences. Contrary to most settings in the literature where agents have the same preference, e.g. in the facility location games all agents would like…

Assignment games represent a tractable yet versatile model of two-sided markets with transfers. We study the likely properties of the core of randomly generated assignment games. If the joint productivities of every firm and worker are…

We consider a sharing economy network where agents embedded in a graph share their resources. This is a fundamental model that abstracts numerous emerging applications of collaborative consumption systems. The agents generate a random…

We study one-sided matching problems where $n$ agents have preferences over $m$ objects and each of them need to be assigned to at most one object. Most work on such problems assume that the agents only have ordinal preferences and usually…

The allocation of scarce donor organs constitutes one of the most consequential algorithmic challenges in healthcare. While the field is rapidly transitioning from rigid, rule-based systems to machine learning and data-driven optimization,…

Motivated by kidney exchange, we study the following mechanism-design problem: On a directed graph (of transplant compatibilities among patient-donor pairs), the mechanism must select a simple path (a chain of transplantations) starting at…

We study a fair division setting in which participants are to be fairly distributed among teams, where not only do the teams have preferences over the participants as in the canonical fair division setting, but the participants also have…

A set of objects is to be divided fairly among agents with different tastes, modeled by additive utility-functions. If we consider the objects as indivisible, many instances of the decision problem: ``Is there a fair division of the objects…

We study the problem of allocating divisible bads (chores) among multiple agents with additive utilities when monetary transfers are not allowed. The competitive rule is known for its remarkable fairness and efficiency properties in the…

The stable marriage and stable roommates problems have been extensively studied due to their high applicability in various real-world scenarios. However, it might happen that no stable solution exists, or stable solutions do not meet…