Related papers: Equilibrium Learning in Combinatorial Auctions: Co…

We study online optimization methods for zero-sum games, a fundamental problem in adversarial learning in machine learning, economics, and many other domains. Traditional methods approximate Nash equilibria (NE) using either regret-based…

Multi-agent policy-gradient methods have been shown to converge locally near stable Nash equilibria. Local convergence, however, does not determine which equilibrium is reached. We study this question through basin-entry probability with…

Understanding the convergence landscape of multi-agent learning is a fundamental problem of great practical relevance in many applications of artificial intelligence and machine learning. While it is known that learning dynamics converge to…

Bayesian game is a strategic decision-making model where each player's type parameter characterizing its own objective is private information: each player knows its own type but not its rivals' types, and Bayesian Nash equilibrium (BNE) is…

This work proposes a novel distributed approach for computing a Nash equilibrium in convex games with restricted strongly monotone pseudo-gradients. By leveraging the idea of the centralized operator extrapolation method presented in [4] to…

We consider multi-agent decision making, where each agent optimizes its cost function subject to constraints. Agents' actions belong to a compact convex Euclidean space and the agents' cost functions are coupled. We propose a distributed…

We introduce a class of Bayesian bidding games for which we prove that the set of pure Nash equilibria is a (non-empty) sublattice and we give a sufficient condition for uniqueness that is often verified in the context of markets with…

We consider generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE) problems in games with strongly monotone pseudo-gradients and jointly linear coupling constraints. We establish the convergence rate of a payoff-based approach intended to learn a variational…

This work examines a stochastic formulation of the generalized Nash equilibrium problem (GNEP) where agents are subject to randomness in the environment of unknown statistical distribution. We focus on fully-distributed online learning by…

This paper addresses the problem of distributed online generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE) learning for multi-cluster games with delayed feedback information. Specifically, each agent in the game is assumed to be informed a sequence of local…

We formulate a general framework for competitive gradient-based learning that encompasses a wide breadth of multi-agent learning algorithms, and analyze the limiting behavior of competitive gradient-based learning algorithms using dynamical…

Generalized Nash Equilibrium Problems (GNEPs) arise in many applications, including non-cooperative multi-agent control problems. Although many methods exist for finding generalized Nash equilibria, most of them rely on assuming knowledge…

In this paper, we investigate the learnability of the function approximator that approximates Nash equilibrium (NE) for games generated from a distribution. First, we offer a generalization bound using the Probably Approximately Correct…

Computing Nash equilibria for strategic multi-agent systems is challenging for expensive black box systems. Motivated by the ubiquity of games involving exploitation of common resources, this paper considers the above problem for potential…

The task of computing approximate Nash equilibria in large zero-sum extensive-form games has received a tremendous amount of attention due mainly to the Annual Computer Poker Competition. Immediately after its inception, two competing and…

Save for some special cases, current training methods for Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs) are at best guaranteed to converge to a `local Nash equilibrium` (LNE). Such LNEs, however, can be arbitrarily far from an actual Nash…

In e-commerce advertising, it is crucial to jointly consider various performance metrics, e.g., user experience, advertiser utility, and platform revenue. Traditional auction mechanisms, such as GSP and VCG auctions, can be suboptimal due…

This work proposes a novel distributed approach for computing a Nash equilibrium in convex games with merely monotone and restricted strongly monotone pseudo-gradients. By leveraging the idea of the centralized operator extrapolation method…

In practice, most auction mechanisms are not strategy-proof, so equilibrium analysis is required to predict bidding behavior. In many auctions, though, an exact equilibrium is not known and one would like to understand whether -- manually…

We consider payoff-based learning of a generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE) in multi-agent systems. Our focus is on games with jointly convex constraints of a linear structure and strongly monotone pseudo-gradients. We present a convergent…