Related papers: Equitable Division of a Path

We study fair allocation of indivisible public goods subject to cardinality (budget) constraints. In this model, we have n agents and m available public goods, and we want to select $k \leq m$ goods in a fair and efficient manner. We first…

Incorporating fairness criteria in optimization problems comes at a certain cost, which is measured by the so-called price of fairness. Here we consider the allocation of indivisible goods. For envy-freeness as fairness criterion it is…

We study the fair division problem of allocating $m$ indivisible goods to $n$ agents with additive personalized bi-valued utilities. Specifically, each agent $i$ assigns one of two positive values $a_i > b_i > 0$ to each good, indicating…

We study the allocation of indivisible goods under conflicting constraints, represented by a graph. In this framework, vertices correspond to goods and edges correspond to conflicts between a pair of goods. Each agent is allocated an…

We study fair and efficient allocation of divisible goods, in an online manner, among $n$ agents. The goods arrive online in a sequence of $T$ time periods. The agents' values for a good are revealed only after its arrival, and the online…

The existence of allocations that are fair and efficient, simultaneously, is a central inquiry in fair division literature. A prominent result in discrete fair division shows that the complementary desiderata of fairness and efficiency can…

This paper re-examines the problem of fairly and efficiently allocating indivisible goods among agents with additive bivalued valuations. Garg and Murhekar (2021) proposed a polynomial-time algorithm that purported to find an EFX and fPO…

We propose a new model for fair division and vehicle routing, where drivers have monotone profit preferences, and their vehicles have feasibility constraints, for customer requests. For this model, we design two new axiomatic notions for…

We consider the problem of fairly allocating a set of indivisible goods to a set of strategic agents with additive valuation functions. We assume no monetary transfers and, therefore, a mechanism in our setting is an algorithm that takes as…

How does one allocate a collection of resources to a set of strategic agents in a fair and efficient manner without using money? For in many scenarios it is not feasible to use money to compensate agents for otherwise unsatisfactory…

We consider a multi-agent model for fair division of mixed manna (i.e. items for which agents can have positive, zero or negative utilities), in which agents have additive utilities for bundles of items. For this model, we give several…

We present a simple local search algorithm for computing EFX (envy-free up to any good) allocations of $m$ indivisible goods among $n$ agents with additive valuations. EFX is a compelling fairness notion, and whether such allocations always…

\textit{Fair division} of resources among competing agents is a fundamental problem in computational social choice and economic game theory. It has been intensively studied on various kinds of items (\textit{divisible} and…

We consider the problem of dividing limited resources to individuals arriving over $T$ rounds. Each round has a random number of individuals arrive, and individuals can be characterized by their type (i.e. preferences over the different…

We propose a new model for aggregating preferences over a set of indivisible items based on a quantile value. In this model, each agent is endowed with a specific quantile, and the value of a given bundle is defined by the corresponding…

This paper studies fair division of divisible and indivisible items among agents whose cardinal preferences are not necessarily monotone. We establish the existence of fair divisions and develop approximation algorithms to compute them. We…

We design online algorithms for the fair allocation of public goods to a set of $N$ agents over a sequence of $T$ rounds and focus on improving their performance using predictions. In the basic model, a public good arrives in each round,…

We study the problem of finding fair allocations -- EF1 and EFX -- of indivisible goods with orientations. In an orientation, every agent gets items from their own predetermined set. For EF1, we show that EF1 orientations always exist when…

Using insights from parametric integer linear programming, we significantly improve on our previous work [Proc. ACM EC 2019] on high-multiplicity fair allocation. Therein, answering an open question from previous work, we proved that the…

We study a fair allocation problem of indivisible items under additive externalities in which each agent also receives values from items that are assigned to other agents. We propose several new fairness concepts. We extend the well-studied…