Related papers: Assignment mechanisms: common preferences and info…

The deployment of AI systems for welfare benefit allocation allows for accelerated decision-making and faster provision of critical help, but has already led to an increase in unfair benefit denials and false fraud accusations. Collecting…

We present partial strategyproofness, a new, relaxed notion of strategyproofness for studying the incentive properties of non-strategyproof assignment mechanisms. Informally, a mechanism is partially strategyproof if it makes truthful…

Information asymmetry is a pervasive feature of multi-agent systems, especially evident in economics and social sciences. In these settings, agents tailor their actions based on private information to maximize their rewards. These strategic…

The cost of error in many high-stakes settings is asymmetric: misdiagnosing pneumonia when absent is an inconvenience, but failing to detect it when present can be life-threatening. Because of this, artificial intelligence (AI) models used…

In some agent designs like inverse reinforcement learning an agent needs to learn its own reward function. Learning the reward function and optimising for it are typically two different processes, usually performed at different stages. We…

A vast majority of the school choice literature focuses on designing mechanisms to simultaneously assign students to many schools, and employs a "make it up as you go along" approach when it comes to each school's admissions policy. An…

This study proposes a new efficiency requirement, a minimal almost weak Pareto principle, which says that x is socially better than y whenever the only one individual never prefers y to x, and all the others prefers x to y. Then, I show…

The issue of fairness in recommendation is becoming increasingly essential as Recommender Systems touch and influence more and more people in their daily lives. In fairness-aware recommendation, most of the existing algorithmic approaches…

We formalize an allocation model under ordinal preferences that is more general than the well-studied Shapley-Scarf housing market. In our model, the agents do not just care which house or resource they get but also care about who gets…

A buyer and a seller bargain over the price of an object. Both players can build reputations for being obstinate by offering the same price over time. Before players bargain, the seller decides whether to adopt a new technology that can…

This paper is dedicated to a cautious learning methodology for predicting preferences between alternatives characterized by binary attributes (formally, each alternative is seen as a subset of attributes). By "cautious", we mean that the…

Recommender systems play a critical role in enhancing user experience by providing personalized suggestions based on user preferences. Traditional approaches often rely on explicit numerical ratings or assume access to fully ranked lists of…

In many matching markets, one side "applies" to the other, and these applications are often expensive and time-consuming (e.g. students applying to college). It is tempting to think that making the application process easier should benefit…

A sender flexibly acquires evidence--which she may pay a third party to certify--to disclose to a receiver. When evidence acquisition is overt, the receiver observes the evidence gathering process irrespective of whether its outcome is…

One-sided matching mechanisms are fundamental for assigning a set of indivisible objects to a set of self-interested agents when monetary transfers are not allowed. Two widely-studied randomized mechanisms in multiagent settings are the…

Interacting agents receive public information at no cost and flexibly acquire private information at a cost proportional to entropy reduction. When a policymaker provides more public information, agents acquire less private information,…

We consider active learning under incentive compatibility constraints. The main application of our results is to economic experiments, in which a learner seeks to infer the parameters of a subject's preferences: for example their attitudes…

Welfare economics relies on access to agents' utility functions: we revisit classical questions in welfare economics, assuming access to data on agents' past choices instead of their utilities. Our main result considers the existence of…

The recent trend for acquiring big data assumes that possessing quantitatively more and qualitatively finer data necessarily provides an advantage that may be critical in competitive situations. Using a model complex adaptive system where…

We study the problem of designing mechanisms for \emph{information acquisition} scenarios. This setting models strategic interactions between an uniformed \emph{receiver} and a set of informed \emph{senders}. In our model the senders…