Related papers: Secure Process Algebra
This research started with an algebra for reasoning about rely/guarantee concurrency for a shared memory model. The approach taken led to a more abstract algebra of atomic steps, in which atomic steps synchronise (rather than interleave)…
The well-known process algebras, such as CCS, ACP and $\pi$-calculus, capture the interleaving concurrency based on bisimilarity semantics. We did some work on truly concurrent process algebras, such as CTC, APTC and $\pi_{tc}$, capture the…
Attacks on classical cryptographic protocols are usually modeled by allowing an adversary to ask queries from an oracle. Security is then defined by requiring that as long as the queries satisfy some constraint, there is some problem the…
Secure multi-party computation (MPC) is a fundamental problem in secure distributed computing. An MPC protocol allows a set of $n$ mutually distrusting parties to carry out any joint computation of their private inputs, without disclosing…
A model-theoretic approach can establish security theorems for cryptographic protocols. Formulas expressing authentication and non-disclosure properties of protocols have a special form. They are quantified implications for all xs . (phi…
We study linking attacks on communication protocols. We show that an active attacker is strictly more powerful in this setting than previously-considered passive attackers. We introduce a formal model to reason about active linkability…
The pi calculus is a basic theory of mobile communication based on the notion of interaction, which, aimed at analyzing and modelling the behaviors of communication process in communicating and mobile systems, is widely applied to the…
Compartmentalization is good security-engineering practice. By breaking a large software system into mutually distrustful components that run with minimal privileges, restricting their interactions to conform to well-defined interfaces, we…
The heterogeneity of the blockchain landscape has motivated the design of blockchain protocols tailored to specific blockchains and applications that, hence, require custom security proofs. We observe that many blockchain protocols share…
Authenticated data structures allow untrusted third parties to carry out operations which produce proofs that can be used to verify an operation's output. Such data structures are challenging to develop and implement correctly. This paper…
The well-known process algebras, such as CCS, ACP and $\pi$-calculus, capture the interleaving concurrency based on bisimilarity semantics. We did some work on truly concurrent process algebras, such as CTC, APTC and $\pi_{tc}$ , capture…
We present a new technique for verifying correspondences in security protocols. In particular, correspondences can be used to formalize authentication. Our technique is fully automatic, it can handle an unbounded number of sessions of the…
Recently efficient model-checking tools have been developed to find flaws in security protocols specifications. These flaws can be interpreted as potential attacks scenarios but the feasability of these scenarios need to be confirmed at the…
A paper presented at the ICICS 2019 conference describes what is claimed to be a `provably secure group authentication [protocol] in the asynchronous communication model'. We show here that this is far from being the case, as the protocol…
A new logic for verification of security policies is proposed. The logic, HyperLTL, extends linear-time temporal logic (LTL) with connectives for explicit and simultaneous quantification over multiple execution paths, thereby enabling…
We find the algebraic laws for true concurrency. Eventually, we establish a whole axiomatization for true concurrency called APTC (Algebra for Parallelism in True Concurrency). The theory APTC has four modules: BATC (Basic Algebra for True…
In this paper, we design secure multi-party computation (MPC) protocols in the asynchronous communication setting with optimal resilience. Our protocols are secure against a computationally-unbounded malicious adversary, characterized by an…
Formal verification of cryptographic protocols typically relies on symbolic models that abstract away compiled code and microarchitectural side channels, leaving a gap between verified specifications and deployed executables. We present a…
The Internet, as it stands today, is highly vulnerable to attacks. However, little has been done to understand and verify the formal security guarantees of proposed secure inter-domain routing protocols, such as Secure BGP (S-BGP). In this…
Based on our previous process algebra for concurrency APTC, we prove that it is reversible with a little modifications. The reversible algebra has four parts: Basic Algebra for Reversible True Concurrency (BARTC), Algebra for Parallelism in…