Related papers: A generalized efficiency mismatch attack to bypass…
We propose and experimentally demonstrate a scheme to render the detection apparatus of a Quantum Key Distribution system immune to the main classes of hacking attacks in which the eavesdropper explores the back-door opened by the…
We suggest a type of attack on quantum cryptosystems that exploits variations in detector efficiency as a function of a control parameter accessible to an eavesdropper. With gated single-photon detectors, this control parameter can be the…
In the recent decade, it has been discovered that QKD systems are extremely vulnerable to side-channel attacks. In particular, by exploiting the internal working knowledge of practical detectors, it is possible to bring them to an operating…
Practical implementations of quantum key distribution (QKD) have been shown to be subject to various detector side-channel attacks that compromise the promised unconditional security. Most notable is a general class of attacks adopting the…
The ability of an eavesdropper (Eve) to perform an intercept-resend attack on a free-space quantum key distribution (QKD) receiver by precisely controlling the incidence angle of an attack laser has been previously demonstrated. However,…
In real-life implementations of quantum key distribution (QKD), the physical systems with unwanted imperfections would be exploited by an eavesdropper. Based on imperfections in the detectors, detector control attacks have been successfully…
Continuous-variable quantum key distribution provides a theoretical unconditionally secure solution to distribute symmetric keys among users in a communication network. However, the practical devices used to implement these systems are…
Quantum key distribution (QKD) enables secure key sharing between distant parties, with several protocols proven resilient against conventional eavesdropping strategies. Here, we introduce a new attack scenario where an eavesdropper, Eve,…
In the last decade, efforts have been made to reconcile theoretical security with realistic imperfect implementations of quantum key distribution (QKD). Implementable countermeasures are proposed to patch the discovered loopholes. However,…
An intercept-resend attack on a continuous-variable quantum-key-distribution protocol is investigated experimentally. By varying the interception fraction, one can implement a family of attacks where the eavesdropper totally controls the…
In spam and malware detection, attackers exploit randomization to obfuscate malicious data and increase their chances of evading detection at test time; e.g., malware code is typically obfuscated using random strings or byte sequences to…
In Gaussian quantum key distribution eavesdropping attacks are conventionally modeled through the universal entangling cloner scheme, which is based on the premise that the whole environment is under control of the adversary, i.e., the…
We examine a situation that $n$ eavesdroppers attack the Bennett-Brassard cryptographic protocol via their own optimal and symmetric strategies. Information gain and mutual information with sender for each eavesdropper are explicitly…
Orthogonal blinding based schemes for wireless physical layer security aim to achieve secure communication by injecting noise into channels orthogonal to the main channel and corrupting the eavesdropper's signal reception. These methods,…
In this paper, we propose an algorithm that targets contamination and eavesdropping adversaries. We consider the case when the number of independent packets available to the eavesdropper is less than the multicast capacity of the network.…
Quantum key distribution (QKD) systems can send signals over more than 100 km standard optical fiber and are widely believed to be secure. Here, we show experimentally for the first time a technologically feasible attack, namely the…
Security of an ideal system for quantum key distribution can be formally proved. However, technological imperfections of real systems can be misused by an eavesdropper to get information about the key without causing a detectable change in…
In free-space quantum key distribution (QKD), the sensitivity of the receiver's detector channels may depend differently on the spatial mode of incoming photons. Consequently, an attacker can control the spatial mode to break security. We…
We devise a simple modification that essentially doubles the efficiency of a well-known quantum key distribution scheme proposed by Bennett and Brassard (BB84). Our scheme assigns significantly different probabilities for the different…
We assume that a buffer-aided transmitter communicates with a receiving node in the presence of an attacker. We investigate the impact of a radio-frequency energy-harvesting attacker that probabilistically operates as a jammer or an…