Related papers: Best-response dynamics in directed network games

In practical applications, decision-makers with heterogeneous dynamics may be engaged in the same decision-making process. This motivates us to study distributed Nash equilibrium seeking for games in which players are mixed-order (first-…

Global trade of material goods involves the potential to create pathways for the spread of infectious pathogens. One trade sector in which this synergy is clearly critical is that of wildlife trade networks. This highly complex system…

Except for special classes of games, there is no systematic framework for analyzing the dynamical properties of multi-agent strategic interactions. Potential games are one such special but restrictive class of games that allow for tractable…

With the advance of complex large-scale networks, it is becoming increasingly important to understand how selfish and spatially distributed individuals will share network resources without centralized coordinations. In this paper, we…

Imitation dynamics for population games are studied and their asymptotic properties analyzed. In the considered class of imitation dynamics - that encompass the replicator equation as well as other models previously considered in…

This paper studies the last-iterate convergence properties of the exponential weights algorithm with constant learning rates. We consider a repeated interaction in discrete time, where each player uses an exponential weights algorithm…

Mechanism design for fully strategic agents commonly assumes broadcast nature of communication between agents of the system. Moreover, for mechanism design, the stability of Nash equilibrium (NE) is demonstrated by showing convergence of…

We present a network influence game that models players strategically seeding the opinions of nodes embedded in a social network. A social learning dynamic, whereby nodes repeatedly update their opinions to resemble those of their…

We introduce a class of cooperative games induced by weighted directed graphs. Specifically, the coalitional value combines an internal interaction term given by the induced subgraph game with an external component based on minimal incoming…

We study an optimal targeting problem for super-modular games with binary actions and finitely many players. The considered problem consists in the selection of a subset of players of minimum size such that, when the actions of these…

This work considers stochastic differential games with a large number of players, whose costs and dynamics interact through the empirical distribution of both their states and their controls. We develop a new framework to prove convergence…

We extend the study of learning in games to dynamics that exhibit non-asymptotic stability. We do so through the notion of uniform stability, which is concerned with equilibria of individually utility-seeking dynamics. Perhaps surprisingly,…

This paper explores distributed Nash equilibrium seeking problems for games in which the players have limited knowledge on other players' actions. In particular, the involved players are considered to be high-order integrators with their…

In order to coordinate players in a game must first identify a target pattern of behaviour. In this paper we investigate the difficulty of identifying prominent outcomes in two kinds of binary action coordination problems in social…

We study the consequences of adopting products by agents who form a social network. To this end we use the threshold model introduced in Apt and Markakis, arXiv:1105.2434, in which the nodes influenced by their neighbours can adopt one out…

In response to a change, individuals may choose to follow the responses of their friends or, alternatively, to change their friends. To model these decisions, consider a game where players choose their behaviors and friendships. In…

This paper presents a model of network formation in repeated games where the players adapt their strategies and network ties simultaneously using a simple reinforcement-learning scheme. It is demonstrated that the coevolutionary dynamics of…

Evolutionary game theory predicts that cooperation in social dilemma games is promoted when agents are connected as a network. However, when networks are fixed over time, humans do not necessarily show enhanced mutual cooperation. Here we…

This paper presents a general closed graph property for (randomized strategy) Nash equilibrium correspondence in large games. In particular, we show that for any large game with a convergent sequence of fiinite-player games, the limit of…

We introduce a general representation of large-population games in which each player s influence ON the others IS centralized AND limited, but may otherwise be arbitrary.This representation significantly generalizes the class known AS…