Related papers: Win-Stay-Lose-Shift as a self-confirming equilibri…
We develop a method based on computer algebra systems to represent the mutual pure strategy best-response dynamics of symmetric two-player, two-action repeated games played by players with a one-period memory. We apply this method to the…
Learning from experience is a key feature of decision-making in cognitively complex organisms. Strategic interactions involving Bayesian inferential strategies can enable us to better understand how evolving individual choices to be…
Cooperative behavior lies at the very basis of human societies, yet its evolutionary origin remains a key unsolved puzzle. Whereas reciprocity or conditional cooperation is one of the most prominent mechanisms proposed to explain the…
We study repeated games where players use an exponential learning scheme in order to adapt to an ever-changing environment. If the game's payoffs are subject to random perturbations, this scheme leads to a new stochastic version of the…
We focus on the heterogeneity of social networks and its role to the emergence of prevailing cooperation and sustaining cooperators. The social networks are representative of the interaction relationships between players and their…
We study an atomic signaling game under stochastic evolutionary dynamics. There is a finite number of players who repeatedly update from a finite number of available languages/signaling strategies. Players imitate the most fit agents with…
Learning problems commonly exhibit an interesting feedback mechanism wherein the population data reacts to competing decision makers' actions. This paper formulates a new game theoretic framework for this phenomenon, called "multi-player…
In many social dilemmas, individuals tend to generate a situation with low payoffs instead of a system optimum ("tragedy of the commons"). Is the routing of traffic a similar problem? In order to address this question, we present…
Partner selection is an important process in many social interactions, permitting individuals to decrease the risks associated with cooperation. In large populations, defectors may escape punishment by roving from partner to partner, but…
We study population dynamics under which each revising agent tests each strategy k times, with each trial being against a newly drawn opponent, and chooses the strategy whose mean payoff was highest. When k = 1, defection is globally stable…
A modified spatial prisoner's dilemma game with voluntary participation in Newman-Watts small-world networks is studied. Some reasonable ingredients are introduced to the game evolutionary dynamics: each agent in the network is a pure…
Evolutionary game theory is a framework to formalize the evolution of collectives ("populations") of competing agents that are playing a game and, after every round, update their strategies to maximize individual payoffs. There are two…
We explore some strategies which tend to perform well in the IPD. We start off by showing the significance of Tit-For-Tat strategies in evolutionary game theory. This is followed by a theoretical derivation of zero-determinant strategies,…
In this work we study a weak Prisoner\^as Dilemma game in which both strategies and update rules are subjected to evolutionary pressure. Interactions among agents are specified by complex topologies, and we consider both homogeneous and…
Motivated by the fact that the same social dilemma can be perceived differently by different players, we here study evolutionary multigames in structured populations. While the core game is the weak prisoner's dilemma, a fraction of the…
A growing body of computational studies shows that simple machine learning agents converge to cooperative behaviors in social dilemmas, such as collusive price-setting in oligopoly markets, raising questions about what drives this outcome.…
We explore the evolutionary dynamics of two games - the Prisoner's Dilemma and the Snowdrift Game - played within distinct networks (layers) of interdependent networks. In these networks imitation and interaction between individuals of…
Spatial evolutionary games provide a valuable framework for elucidating the emergence and maintenance of cooperative behavior. However, most previous studies assume that individuals are profiteers and neglect to consider the effects of…
Evolutionary game theory has been widely used to study the evolution of cooperation in social dilemmas where imitation-led strategy updates are typically assumed. However, results of recent behavioral experiments are not compatible with the…
The world in which we are living is a huge network of networks and should be described by interdependent networks. The interdependence between networks significantly affects the evolutionary dynamics of cooperation on them. Meanwhile, due…