Related papers: Spatial Parrondo games with spatially dependent ga…
Cooperative game theory deals with systems where players want to cooperate to improve their payoffs. But players may choose coalitions in a non-cooperative manner, leading to a coalition-formation game. We consider such a game with several…
We consider the following two-player game on a graph. A token is located at a vertex, and the players take turns to move it along an edge to a vertex that has not been visited before. A player who cannot move loses. We analyze outcomes with…
The $N$-player quantum game is analyzed in the context of an Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) experiment. In this setting, a player's strategies are not unitary transformations as in alternate quantum game-theoretic frameworks, but a classical…
Facility location games have been a topic of major interest in economics, operations research and computer science, starting from the seminal work by Hotelling. Spatial facility location models have successfully predicted the outcome of…
A finite impartial game is a two-player game in which the players take turns making moves and the game ends after finitely many moves. In this paper, we study a class of finite impartial games introduced by H.~Lenstra, which we call coin…
We consider discrete time Brownian ratchet models: Parrondo's games. Using the Fourier transform, we calculate the exact probability distribution functions for both the capital dependent and history dependent Parrondo's games. We find that…
Income redistribution is the transfer of income from some individuals to others directly or indirectly by means of social mechanisms, such as taxation, public services and so on. Employing a spatial public goods game, we study the influence…
We consider a setting in which a principal gets to choose which game from some given set is played by a group of agents. The principal would like to choose a game that favors one of the players, the social preferences of the players, or the…
A local agglomeration of cooperators can support the survival or spreading of cooperation, even when cooperation is predicted to die out according to the replicator equation, which is often used in evolutionary game theory to study the…
Trust and reciprocation of it form the foundation of economic, social and other interactions. While the Trust Game is widely used to study these concepts for interactions between two players, often alternating different roles (i.e.,…
Classical game theory is a powerful framework to analyze the strategic interactions among rational players. However, in many real-life scenarios, players choose actions based on their inherent natural tendencies rather than deliberate…
We study an evolutionary game of chance in which the probabilities for different outcomes (e.g., heads or tails) depend on the amount wagered on those outcomes. The game is perhaps the simplest possible probabilistic game in which…
It is known that a player in a noncooperative game can benefit by publicly restricting his possible moves before play begins. We show that, more generally, a player may benefit by publicly committing to pay an external party an amount that…
A modified spatial prisoner's dilemma game with voluntary participation in Newman-Watts small-world networks is studied. Some reasonable ingredients are introduced to the game evolutionary dynamics: each agent in the network is a pure…
We study an elementary two-player card game where in each round players compare cards and the holder of the smallest card wins. Using the rate equations approach, we treat the stochastic version of the game in which cards are drawn…
The study of evolutionary games with pairwise local interactions has been of interest to many different disciplines. Also local interactions with multiple opponents had been considered, although always for a fixed amount of players. In many…
We analyze a reputational bargaining game in which a central player negotiates simultaneously with two peripheral players. Each player is either rational or a commitment type who never concedes and insists on a fixed share, and concessions…
Given a dynamic ordinal game, we deem a strategy sequentially rational if there exist a Bernoulli utility function and a conditional probability system with respect to which the strategy is a maximizer. We establish a complete class theorem…
We introduce a game where players selfishly choose a resource and endure a cost depending on the number of players choosing nearby resources. We model the influences among resources by a weighted graph, directed or not. These games are…
Duparc introduced a two-player game for a function $f$ between zero-dimensional Polish spaces in which Player II has a winning strategy iff $f$ is of Baire class 1. We generalize this result by defining a game for an arbitrary function $f :…