Related papers: Approximations for a Queueing Game Model with Join…
This paper presents an extension of Naor's analysis on the join-or-balk problem in observable M/M/1 queues. While all other Markovian assumptions still hold, we explore this problem assuming uncertain arrival rates under the…
We consider the problem of customer equilibrium strategies in an M/M/1 queue under dynamic service control. The service rate switches between a low and a high value depending on system congestion. Arriving customers do not observe the…
We study the strategic purchasing of priorities in a time-dependent accumulating priority M/G/$1$ queue. We formulate a non-cooperative game in which customers purchase priority coefficients with the goal of reducing waiting costs in…
We analyse a non-cooperative strategic game among two ride-hailing platforms, each of which is modeled as a two-sided queueing system, where drivers (with a certain patience level) are assumed to arrive according to a Poisson process at a…
We consider a large queueing system that consists of many strategic servers that are weakly interacting. Each server processes jobs from its unique critically loaded buffer and controls the rate of arrivals and departures associated with…
In this study, we consider multi-class multi-server asymmetric queueing systems consisting of $N$ queues on one side and $K$ servers on the other side, where jobs randomly arrive in queues at each time. The service rate of each job-server…
Motivated by applications in online marketplaces such as ride-hailing platforms and payment channel networks, we study a single-server queue with state-dependent arrival control. The service operator dynamically chooses the arrival rate as…
In this paper, we consider queueing systems where the dynamics are non-stationary and state-dependent. For performance analysis of these systems, fluid and diffusion models have been typically used. Although they are proven to be…
This paper presents a queueing network approach to the analysis and control of mobility-on-demand (MoD) systems for urban personal transportation. A MoD system consists of a fleet of vehicles providing one-way car sharing service and a team…
We model parking in urban centers as a set of parallel queues and overlay a game theoretic structure that allows us to compare the user-selected (Nash) equilibrium to the socially optimal equilibrium. We model arriving drivers as utility…
We analyse a non-cooperative game between two competing ride-hailing platforms, each of which is modeled as a two-sided queueing system, where drivers (with a limited level of patience) are assumed to arrive according to a Poisson process…
In this paper, we study a controllable tandem queueing system consisting of two nodes and a controller, in which customers arrive according to a Poisson process and must receive service at both nodes before leaving the system. A decision…
A supermarket game is considered with $N$ FCFS queues with unit exponential service rate and global Poisson arrival rate $N \lambda$. Upon arrival each customer chooses a number of queues to be sampled uniformly at random and joins the…
A parallel server system with $n$ identical servers is considered. The service time distribution has a finite mean $1/\mu$, but otherwise is arbitrary. Arriving customers are be routed to one of the servers immediately upon arrival.…
We consider a polling system with two queues, exhaustive service, no switch-over times and exponential service times. The waiting cost depends on the position of the queue relative to the server: It costs a customer c per time unit to wait…
We consider a queuing network that opens at a specified time, where customers are non-atomic and belong to different classes. Each class has its own route, and as is typical in the literature, the costs are a linear function of waiting and…
In this paper we consider a mean field approach to modeling the agents flow over a transportation network. In particular, beside a standard framework of mean field games, with controlled dynamics by the agents and costs mass-distribution…
We consider a model of priced resource sharing that combines both queueing behavior and strategic behavior. We study a priority service model where a single server allocates its capacity to agents in proportion to their payment to the…
We consider any network environment in which the "best shot game" is played. This is the case where the possible actions are only two for every node (0 and 1), and the best response for a node is 1 if and only if all her neighbors play 0. A…
We consider a service system where agents (or, servers) are invited on-demand. Customers arrive as a Poisson process and join a customer queue. Customer service times are i.i.d. exponential. Agents' behavior is random in two respects.…