Related papers: The Communication Complexity of Payment Computatio…
We consider active learning under incentive compatibility constraints. The main application of our results is to economic experiments, in which a learner seeks to infer the parameters of a subject's preferences: for example their attitudes…
We study incentive-compatible mechanisms that maximize the Nash Social Welfare. Since traditional incentive-compatible mechanisms cannot maximize the Nash Social Welfare even approximately, we propose changing the traditional model.…
We consider the question of implementability of a social choice function in a classical setting where the preferences of finitely many selfish individuals with private information have to be aggregated towards a social choice. This is one…
We study the power of randomness in the Number-on-Forehead (NOF) model in communication complexity. We construct an explicit 3-player function $f:[N]^3 \to \{0,1\}$, such that: (i) there exist a randomized NOF protocol computing it that…
We study notions of fairness in decision-making systems when individuals have diverse preferences over the possible outcomes of the decisions. Our starting point is the seminal work of Dwork et al. which introduced a notion of individual…
We study the communication complexity of symmetric XOR functions, namely functions $f: \{0,1\}^n \times \{0,1\}^n \rightarrow \{0,1\}$ that can be formulated as $f(x,y)=D(|x\oplus y|)$ for some predicate $D: \{0,1,...,n\} \rightarrow…
We study the multiparty communication complexity of high dimensional permutations, in the Number On the Forehead (NOF) model. This model is due to Chandra, Furst and Lipton (CFL) who also gave a nontrivial protocol for the Exactly-n problem…
A fundamental assumption in classical mechanism design is that buyers are perfect optimizers. However, in practice, buyers may be limited by their computational capabilities or a lack of information, and may not be able to perfectly…
The LogRank conjecture of Lov\'asz and Saks from 1988 is the most famous open problem in the communication complexity theory. The statement is as follows: Suppose that two players intend to compute a Boolean function $f(x,y)$ when $x$ is…
Protocols for tossing a common coin play a key role in the vast majority of implementations of consensus. Even though the common coins in the literature are usually \emph{fair} (they have equal chance of landing heads or tails), we focus on…
Concurrent Constraint Programming (CCP) is a simple and powerful model for concurrency where agents interact by telling and asking constraints. Since their inception, CCP-languages have been designed for having a strong connection to logic.…
In this short note, we initiate the study of the Linear Isomorphism Testing Problem in the setting of communication complexity, a natural linear algebraic generalization of the classical Equality problem. Given Boolean functions $f, g :…
Let $f : \{0,1\}^n \times \{0,1\}^n \rightarrow \{0,1\}$ be a 2-party function. For every product distribution $\mu$ on $\{0,1\}^n \times \{0,1\}^n$, we show that $$\mathsf{CC}^\mu_{0.49}(f) = O\left(\left(\log \mathsf{prt}_{1/8}(f) \cdot…
We investigates a model of hybrid classical-quantum communication complexity, in which two parties first exchange classical messages and subsequently communicate using quantum messages. We study the trade-off between the classical and…
Incentive mechanism is crucial for federated learning (FL) when rational clients do not have the same interests in the global model as the server. However, due to system heterogeneity and limited budget, it is generally impractical for the…
We study the communication complexity of truthful combinatorial auctions, and in particular the case where valuations are either subadditive or single-minded, which we denote with $\mathsf{SubAdd}\cup\mathsf{SingleM}$. We show that for…
We establish novel connections between magic in quantum circuits and communication complexity. In particular, we show that functions computable with low magic have low communication cost. Our first result shows that the $\mathsf{D}\|$…
Peer prediction mechanisms are often adopted to elicit truthful contributions from crowd workers when no ground-truth verification is available. Recently, mechanisms of this type have been developed to incentivize effort exertion, in…
An important class of game-theoretic incentive mechanisms for eliciting effort from a crowd are the peer based mechanisms, in which workers are paid by matching their answers with one another. The other classic mechanism is to have the…
Given a capacitated communication network $\mathcal{N}$ and a function f that needs to be computed on $\mathcal{N},$ we study the problem of generating a computation and communication schedule in $\mathcal{N}$ to maximize the rate of…