Related papers: Contract-Aware Secure Compilation
Secure compilation prevents all low-level attacks on compiled code and allows for sound reasoning about security in the source language. In this work we propose a new attacker model for secure compilation that extends the well-known notion…
Secure compilers generate compiled code that withstands many target-level attacks such as alteration of control flow, data leaks or memory corruption. Many existing secure compilers are proven to be fully abstract, meaning that they reflect…
We propose a new formal criterion for evaluating secure compilation schemes for unsafe languages, expressing end-to-end security guarantees for software components that may become compromised after encountering undefined behavior---for…
Compartmentalization is good security-engineering practice. By breaking a large software system into mutually distrustful components that run with minimal privileges, restricting their interactions to conform to well-defined interfaces, we…
We propose a new formal criterion for secure compilation, providing strong security guarantees for components written in unsafe, low-level languages with C-style undefined behavior. Our criterion goes beyond recent proposals, which protect…
Microarchitectural attacks compromise security by exploiting software-visible artifacts of microarchitectural optimizations such as caches and speculative execution. Defending against such attacks at the software level requires an…
When implementing secure software, developers must ensure certain requirements, such as the erasure of secret data after its use and execution in real time. Such requirements are not explicitly captured by the C language and could…
Secure compilation studies compilers that generate target-level components that are as secure as their source-level counterparts. Full abstraction is the most widely-proven property when defining a secure compiler. A compiler is modular if…
Attackers can access sensitive information of programs by exploiting the side-effects of speculatively-executed instructions using Spectre attacks. To mitigate theses attacks, popular compilers deployed a wide range of countermeasures. The…
Undefined behavior in C often causes devastating security vulnerabilities. One practical mitigation is compartmentalization, which allows developers to structure large programs into mutually distrustful compartments with clearly specified…
Computer systems are so complex, so they are usually designed and analyzed in terms of layers of abstraction. Complexity is still a challenge facing logical reasoning tools that are used to find software design flaws and implementation…
There is a growing need for hardware-software contracts which precisely define the implications of microarchitecture on software security-i.e., security contracts. It is our view that such contracts should explicitly account for…
The implementations of most hardened cryptographic libraries use defensive programming techniques for side-channel resistance. These techniques are usually specified as guidelines to developers on specific code patterns to use or avoid.…
Encrypted computing is an emerging technology based on a processor that `works encrypted', taking encrypted inputs to encrypted outputs while data remains in encrypted form throughout. It aims to secure user data against possible insider…
Side-channel attacks impose a serious threat to cryptographic algorithms, including widely employed ones, such as AES and RSA. These attacks take advantage of the algorithm implementation in hardware or software to extract secret…
Modern processors are highly optimized systems where every single cycle of computation time matters. Many optimizations depend on the data that is being processed. Software-based microarchitectural attacks exploit effects of these…
To ensure that secure applications do not leak their secrets, they are required to uphold several security properties such as spatial and temporal memory safety as well as cryptographic constant time. Existing work shows how to enforce…
Secure applications implement software protections against side-channel and physical attacks. Such protections are meaningful at machine code or micro-architectural level, but they typically do not carry observable semantics at source…
Memory corruption vulnerabilities are endemic to unsafe languages, such as C, and they can even be found in safe languages that themselves are implemented in unsafe languages or linked with libraries implemented in unsafe languages. Robust…
The most prominent formal criterion for secure compilation is full abstraction, the preservation and reflection of contextual equivalence. Recent work introduced robust compilation, defined as the preservation of robust satisfaction of…