Related papers: Answer to an open question concerning the $1/e$-st…
We explore the connection between an agent's decision problem and her ranking of information structures. We find that a finite amount of ordinal data on the agent's ranking of experiments is enough to identify her (finite) set of…
We study a variant of the single-choice prophet inequality problem where the decision-maker does not know the underlying distribution and has only access to a set of samples from the distributions. Rubinstein et al. [2020] showed that the…
In this paper we consider a real time queuing system with rewards and deadlines. We assume that packet processing time is known upon arrival, as is the case in communication networks. This assumption allows us to demonstrate that the well…
Shortlisting is a common and effective method for pre-selecting participants in competitive settings. To ensure fairness, a cut-off score is typically announced, allowing only contestants who exceed it to enter the contest, while others are…
This paper considers the ranking problem of candidates for a certain position based on ballot papers filled by voters. We suggest a ranking procedure of alternatives using cooperative game theory methods. For this, it is necessary to…
We study an admissions control problem, where a queue with service rate $1-p$ receives incoming jobs at rate $\lambda\in(1-p,1)$, and the decision maker is allowed to redirect away jobs up to a rate of $p$, with the objective of minimizing…
We consider the secretary problem through the lens of learning-augmented algorithms. As it is known that the best possible expected competitive ratio is $1/e$ in the classic setting without predictions, a natural goal is to design…
This paper focuses on managing the cost of deliberation before action. In many problems, the overall quality of the solution reflects costs incurred and resources consumed in deliberation as well as the cost and benefit of execution, when…
I study the optimal provision of information in a long-term relationship between a sender and a receiver. The sender observes a persistent, evolving state and commits to send signals over time to the receiver, who sequentially chooses…
The last success problem is an optimal stopping problem that aims to maximize the probability of stopping on the last success in a sequence of independent $n$ Bernoulli trials. In the classical setting where complete information about the…
The secretary problem is probably the purest model of decision making under uncertainty. In this paper we ask which advice can we give the algorithm to improve its success probability? We propose a general model that unifies a broad range…
We study the voting game where agents' preferences are endogenously decided by the information they receive, and they can collaborate in a group. We show that strategic voting behaviors have a positive impact on leading to the ``correct''…
In this paper we study a single machine scheduling problem with the objective of minimizing the sum of completion times. Each of the given jobs is either short or long. However the processing times are initially hidden to the algorithm, but…
We consider a social planner faced with a stream of myopic selfish agents. The goal of the social planner is to maximize the social welfare, however, it is limited to using only information asymmetry (regarding previous outcomes) and cannot…
We demonstrate that the set of cost distributions under which the optimal strategy for maximizing compliance (or more generally, effort) in a binary choice environment is identical to the optimal strategy for maximizing the accuracy of the…
Algorithms with predictions is a recent framework for decision-making under uncertainty that leverages the power of machine-learned predictions without making any assumption about their quality. The goal in this framework is for algorithms…
We study how to optimally design selection mechanisms, accounting for agents' investment incentives. A principal wishes to allocate a resource of homogeneous quality to a heterogeneous population of agents. The principal commits to a…
We study a fundamental problem in optimization under uncertainty. There are $n$ boxes; each box $i$ contains a hidden reward $x_i$. Rewards are drawn i.i.d. from an unknown distribution $\mathcal{D}$. For each box $i$, we see $y_i$, an…
Given integers $1\leq k<n$, the Gusein-Zade version of a generalized secretary problem is to choose one of the $k$ best of $n$ candidates for a secretary, which are interviewing in random order. The stopping rule in the selection is based…
Recent work has shown that temporally extended actions (options) can be learned fully end-to-end as opposed to being specified in advance. While the problem of "how" to learn options is increasingly well understood, the question of "what"…