Related papers: Continuous Positional Payoffs
Whether it be in normal form games, or in fair allocations, or in voter preferences in voting systems, a certain pattern of reasoning is common. From a particular profile, an agent or a group of agents may have an incentive to shift to a…
Economic ensembles can be modeled as networks of interacting agents whose be-haviors are described in terms of game theory. The evolutionary paradigm has been applied to two-person games to discover strategies in this context.…
We propose a learning dynamics to model how strategic agents repeatedly play a continuous game while relying on an information platform to learn an unknown payoff-relevant parameter. In each time step, the platform updates a belief estimate…
We consider multiplayer stochastic games in which the payoff of each player is a bounded and Borel-measurable function of the infinite play. By using a generalization of the technique of Martin (1998) and Maitra and Sudderth (1998), we show…
In most studies regarding evolutionary game dynamics, the effective payoff, a quantity that translates the payoff derived from game interactions into reproductive success, is usually assumed to be a specific function of the payoff.…
This paper studies an incentive structure for cooperation and its stability in peer-assisted services when there exist multiple content providers, using a coalition game theoretic approach. We first consider a generalized coalition…
Stochastic two-player games model systems with an environment that is both adversarial and stochastic. The adversarial part of the environment is modeled by a player (Player 2) who tries to prevent the system (Player 1) from achieving its…
We consider zero-sum stochastic games with perfect information and finitely many states and actions. The payoff is computed by a function which associates to each infinite sequence of states and actions a real number. We prove that if the…
Despite the significant potential for various applications, stochastic games with long-run average payoffs have received limited scholarly attention, particularly concerning the development of learning algorithms for them due to the…
We consider infinite-state turn-based stochastic games of two players, Box and Diamond, who aim at maximizing and minimizing the expected total reward accumulated along a run, respectively. Since the total accumulated reward is unbounded,…
This paper examines equilibria in dynamic two-sided matching games, extending Gale and Shapley's foundational model to a non-cooperative, decentralized, and dynamic framework. We focus on markets where agents have utility functions and…
In two-player games on graph, the players construct an infinite path through the game graph and get a reward computed by a payoff function over infinite paths. Over weighted graphs, the typical and most studied payoff functions compute the…
We introduce the concept of attainable sets of payoffs in two-player repeated games with vector payoffs. A set of payoff vectors is called {\em attainable} if player 1 can ensure that there is a finite horizon $T$ such that after time $T$…
Long-term cooperation, competition, or exploitation among individuals can be modeled through repeated games. In repeated games, Press and Dyson discovered zero-determinant (ZD) strategies that enforce a special relationship between two…
In the window mean-payoff objective, given an infinite path, instead of considering a long run average, we consider the minimum payoff that can be ensured at every position of the path over a finite window that slides over the entire path.…
We consider concurrent mean-payoff games, a very well-studied class of two-player (player 1 vs player 2) zero-sum games on finite-state graphs where every transition is assigned a reward between 0 and 1, and the payoff function is the…
In this paper the set of value functions of all-possible zero-sum differential games with terminal payoff is characterized. The necessary and sufficient condition for a given function to be a value of some differential game with terminal…
This paper provides sufficient conditions for the existence of solutions for two-person zero-sum games with inf/sup-compact payoff functions and with possibly noncompact decision sets for both players. Payoff functions may be unbounded, and…
This paper presents a learning dynamic with almost sure convergence guarantee for any stochastic game with turn-based controllers (on state transitions) as long as stage-payoffs induce a zero-sum or identical-interest game. Stage-payoffs…
In game theory, players have continuous expected payoff functions and can use fixed point theorems to locate equilibria. This optimization method requires that players adopt a particular type of probability measure space. Here, we introduce…