Related papers: A note on the intuitionistic logic of false belief
In the literature, the question about how to axiomatize the transitive logic of false belief is thought of as hard and left as an open problem. In this paper, among other contributions, we deal with this problem. In more details, although…
Nonmonotonic logics are usually characterized by the presence of some notion of 'conditional' that fails monotonicity. Research on nonmonotonic logics is therefore largely concerned with the defeasibility of argument forms and the…
The introduction of explicit notions of rejection, or disbelief, into logics for knowledge representation can be justified in a number of ways. Motivations range from the need for versions of negation weaker than classical negation, to the…
We learn mathematics subjectively and must apply it objectively. But sometimes, we apply it subjectively by using wrong intuitions which may be elusive to our eyes. The aim of this note is to disclose the secretes of two kinds of these…
Accepting a proposition means that our confidence in this proposition is strictly greater than the confidence in its negation. This paper investigates the subclass of uncertainty measures, expressing confidence, that capture the idea of…
Evaluating an explanation's faithfulness is desired for many reasons such as trust, interpretability and diagnosing the sources of model's errors. In this work, which focuses on the NLI task, we introduce the methodology of…
The usual reading of logical implication "A implies B" as "if A then B" fails in intuitionistic logic: there are formulas A and B such that "A implies B" is not provable, even though B is provable whenever A is provable. Intuitionistic…
There are many ways we can not know. Even in systems that we created ourselves, as, for example, systems in mathematical logic, Go\"edel and Tarski's theorems impose limits on what we can know. As we try to speak of the real world, things…
A semantics is given to possibilistic logic, a logic that handles weighted classical logic formulae, and where weights are interpreted as lower bounds on degrees of certainty or possibility, in the sense of Zadeh's possibility theory. The…
The idea of fully accepting statements when the evidence has rendered them probable enough faces a number of difficulties. We leave the interpretation of probability largely open, but attempt to suggest a contextual approach to full belief.…
We study elementary modal logics, i.e. modal logic considered over first-order definable classes of frames. The classical semantics of modal logic allows infinite structures, but often practical applications require to restrict our…
We develop a logical framework for reasoning about knowledge and evidence in which the agent may be uncertain about how to interpret their evidence. Rather than representing an evidential state as a fixed subset of the state space, our…
Moores Paradox is a test case for any formal theory of belief. In Knowledge and Belief, Hintikka developed a multimodal logic for statements that express sentences containing the epistemic notions of knowledge and belief. His account…
The concept of informal mathematical proof considered in intuitionism is apparently vulnerable to a version of the liar paradox. However, a careful reevaluation of this concept reveals a subtle error whose correction blocks the…
We present some arguments for the thesis that a set-theoretic inspired faith, in the ability of intuitive truth to faithfully reflect relationships between elements of a Platonic universe, may be as misplaced as an assumption that such…
The main aim of the present paper is to use a proof system for hybrid modal logic to formalize what are called falsebelief tasks in cognitive psychology, thereby investigating the interplay between cognition and logical reasoning about…
The intuitive notion of evidence has both semantic and syntactic features. In this paper, we develop an {\em evidence logic} for epistemic agents faced with possibly contradictory evidence from different sources. The logic is based on a…
In this paper, we present an alternative interpretation of propositional inquisitive logic as an epistemic logic of knowing how. In our setting, an inquisitive logic formula $\alpha$ being supported by a state is formalized as "knowing how…
We establish completeness for intuitionistic first-order logic, iFOL, showing that a formula is provable if and only if its embedding into minimal logic, mFOL, is uniformly valid under the Brouwer Heyting Kolmogorov (BHK) semantics, the…
Probability theory, epistemically interpreted, provides an excellent, if not the best available account of inductive reasoning. This is so because there are general and definite rules for the change of subjective probabilities through…