Related papers: Decision Making under Uncertainty: A Game of Two S…

Consider a persuasion game where both the sender and receiver are ambiguity averse with maxmin expected utility (MEU) preferences and the sender can choose an ambiguous information structure. This paper analyzes the game in an ex-ante…

Existing observational approaches for learning human preferences, such as inverse reinforcement learning, usually make strong assumptions about the observability of the human's environment. However, in reality, people make many important…

We study a class of two-player repeated games with incomplete information and informational externalities. In these games, two states are chosen at the outset, and players get private information on the pair, before engaging in repeated…

This paper provides an analysis of different formal representations of beliefs in epistemic game theory. The aim is to attempt a synthesis of different structures of beliefs in the presence of indeterminate probabilities. Special attention…

In the recently introduced topological distance games, strategic agents need to be assigned to a subset of vertices of a topology. In the assignment, the utility of an agent depends on both the agent's inherent utilities for other agents…

We study Bayesian coordination games where agents receive noisy private information over the game's payoffs, and over each others' actions. If private information over actions is of low quality, equilibrium uniqueness obtains in a manner…

This paper analyses how risk-taking behaviour and preferences over consumption rank can emerge as a neutrally stable equilibrium when individuals face an anti-coordination task. If in an otherwise homogeneous society information about…

We study Bayesian coordination games where agents receive noisy private information over the game's payoff structure, and over each others' actions. If private information over actions is precise, we find that agents can coordinate on…

The recent discovery of zero-determinant strategies for the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma sparked a surge of interest in the surprising fact that a player can exert unilateral control over iterated interactions. These remarkable strategies,…

In stochastic games with incomplete information, the uncertainty is evoked by the lack of knowledge about a player's own and the other players' types, i.e. the utility function and the policy space, and also the inherent stochasticity of…

This paper studies the monotonicity of equilibrium costs and equilibrium loads in nonatomic congestion games, in response to variations of the demands. The main goal is to identify conditions under which a paradoxical non-monotone behavior…

We present a novel two-player game in a chaotic dynamical system where players have opposing objectives regarding the system's behavior. The game is analyzed using a methodology from the field of chaos control known as partial control. Our…

A greedy personality is usually accompanied by arrogance and confidence. This work investigates the cooperation success condition in the context of biased payoff allocation and self-confidence. The first component allows the organizer in a…

Monotonicity and recursivity are central assumptions in intertemporal consumption problems under ambiguity. We show that monotone recursive preferences admit both a recursive and an ex-ante representation, and that the certainty equivalent…

Many real-world situations of ethical relevance, in particular those of large-scale social choice such as mitigating climate change, involve not only many agents whose decisions interact in complicated ways, but also various forms of…

The global dynamics is investigated for a duopoly game where the perfect foresight hypothesis is relaxed and firms are worst-case maximizers. Overlooking the degree of product substitutability as well as the sensitivity of price to…

In this paper I present several algorithmic techniques for improving the decision process of multiple types of agents behaving in environments where their interests are in conflict. The interactions between the agents are modelled by using…

A range of empirical puzzles in finance has been explained as a consequence of traders being averse to ambiguity. Ambiguity averse traders can behave in financial portfolio problems in ways that cannot be rationalized as maximizing…

Motivated by applications in cyber security, we develop a simple game model for describing how a learning agent's private information influences an observing agent's inference process. The model describes a situation in which one of the…

Unaided human decision making appears to systematically violate consistency constraints imposed by normative theories; these biases in turn appear to justify the application of formal decision-analytic models. It is argued that both claims…