Related papers: RegulaTor: A Straightforward Website Fingerprintin…
Website Fingerprinting attacks enable a passive eavesdropper to recover the user's otherwise anonymized web browsing activity by matching the observed traffic with prerecorded web traffic templates. The defenses that have been proposed to…
Website fingerprinting (WF) attacks identify the websites visited over anonymized connections by analyzing patterns in network traffic flows, such as packet sizes, directions, or interval times using a machine learning classifier. Previous…
Tor is a low-latency anonymous communication network that protects user privacy by encrypting website traffic. However, recent website fingerprinting (WF) attacks have shown that encrypted traffic can still leak users' visited websites by…
Online anonymity and privacy has been based on confusing the adversary by creating indistinguishable network elements. Tor is the largest and most widely deployed anonymity system, designed against realistic modern adversaries. Recently,…
Website Fingerprinting (WF) attacks identify the websites visited by users by performing traffic analysis, compromising user privacy. Particularly, DL-based WF attacks demonstrate impressive attack performance. However, the effectiveness of…
Website fingerprinting (WF) is a technique that allows an eavesdropper to determine the website a target user is accessing by inspecting the metadata associated with the packets she exchanges via some encrypted tunnel, e.g., Tor. Recent WF…
Website fingerprinting enables an eavesdropper to determine which websites a user is visiting over an encrypted connection. State-of-the-art website fingerprinting (WF) attacks have demonstrated effectiveness even against Tor-protected…
Website fingerprinting enables an attacker to infer which web page a client is browsing through encrypted or anonymized network connections. We present a new website fingerprinting technique based on random decision forests and evaluate…
Website Fingerprinting (WF) attacks aim to infer which websites a user is visiting by analyzing traffic patterns, thereby compromising user anonymity. Although this technique has been demonstrated to be effective in controlled experimental…
Tor is an anonymity network used by millions of people every day to evade censorship and protect their browsing activity from privacy threats such as mass surveillance. Unfortunately, Tor has been shown to be vulnerable to website…
Website fingerprinting (WF) attacks remain a significant threat to encrypted traffic, prompting the development of a wide range of defenses. Among these, two prominent classes are regularization-based defenses, which shape traffic using…
Website fingerprinting attack (WFA) aims to deanonymize the website a user is visiting through anonymous networks channels (e.g., Tor). Despite of remarkable progress in the past years, most existing methods make implicitly a couple of…
Website fingerprinting is an attack that uses size and timing characteristics of encrypted downloads to identify targeted websites. Since this can defeat the privacy goals of anonymity networks such as Tor, many algorithms to defend against…
Tor recently integrated a circuit padding framework for creating padding machines: defenses that work by defining state machines that inject dummy traffic to protect against traffic analysis attacks like Website Fingerprinting (WF) attacks.…
Website Fingerprinting (WF) attacks can effectively identify the websites visited by Tor clients via analyzing encrypted traffic patterns. Existing attacks focus on identifying different websites, but their accuracy dramatically decreases…
Browser fingerprinting is an invasive and opaque stateless tracking technique. Browser vendors, academics, and standards bodies have long struggled to provide meaningful protections against browser fingerprinting that are both accurate and…
Website fingerprinting attacks, which use statistical analysis on network traffic to compromise user privacy, have been shown to be effective even if the traffic is sent over anonymity-preserving networks such as Tor. The classical attack…
In webpage fingerprinting, an on-path adversary infers the specific webpage loaded by a victim user by analysing the patterns in the encrypted TLS traffic exchanged between the user's browser and the website's servers. This work studies…
Traffic analysis attacks to identify which web page a client is browsing, using only her packet metadata --- known as website fingerprinting --- has been proven effective in closed-world experiments against privacy technologies like Tor.…
Several studies have shown that the network traffic that is generated by a visit to a website over Tor reveals information specific to the website through the timing and sizes of network packets. By capturing traffic traces between users…