Related papers: Objective Bayesian approach to the Jeffreys-Lindle…
This paper is concerned with the well known Jeffreys-Lindley paradox. In a Bayesian set up, the so-called paradox arises when a point null hypothesis is tested and an objective prior is sought for the alternative hypothesis. In particular,…
This paper discusses the dual interpretation of the Jeffreys--Lindley's paradox associated with Bayesian posterior probabilities and Bayes factors, both as a differentiation between frequentist and Bayesian statistics and as a pointer to…
In 1957, Lindley published "A statistical paradox" in Biometrika, revealing a fundamental conflict between frequentist and Bayesian inference as sample size approaches infinity. We present a new paradox of a different kind: a conflict…
The Jeffreys-Lindley paradox stands as the most profound divergence between frequentist and Bayesian approaches to hypothesis testing. Yet despite more than six decades of discussion, this paradox remains frequently misunderstood--even in…
Inference from limited data requires a notion of measure on parameter space, most explicit in the Bayesian framework as a prior. Here we demonstrate that Jeffreys prior, the best-known uninformative choice, introduces enormous bias when…
Jeffreys-Lindley paradox is a case where frequentist and Bayesian hypothesis testing methodologies contradict with each other. This has caused confusion among data analysts for selecting a methodology for their statistical inference tasks.…
The Jeffreys-Lindley paradox exposes a rift between Bayesian and frequentist hypothesis testing that strikes at the heart of statistical inference. Contrary to what most current literature suggests, the paradox was central to the Bayesian…
It has long been known that for the comparison of pairwise nested models, a decision based on the Bayes factor produces a consistent model selector (in the frequentist sense). Here we go beyond the usual consistency for nested pairwise…
A Bayesian inference method for problems with small samples and sparse data is presented in this paper. A general type of prior ($\propto 1/\sigma^{q}$) is proposed to formulate the Bayesian posterior for inference problems under small…
Bayesian methods are increasingly applied in these days in the theory and practice of statistics. Any Bayesian inference depends on a likelihood and a prior. Ideally one would like to elicit a prior from related sources of information or…
The so-called Lindley paradox is a counterintuitive statistical effect where the Bayesian and frequentist approaches to hypothesis testing give radically different answers, depending on the choice of the prior distribution. In this paper we…
We introduce a new class of priors for Bayesian hypothesis testing, which we name "cake priors". These priors circumvent Bartlett's paradox (also called the Jeffreys-Lindley paradox); the problem associated with the use of diffuse priors…
In many common situations, a Bayesian credible interval will be, given the same data, very similar to a frequentist confidence interval, and researchers will interpret these intervals in a similar fashion. However, no predictable similarity…
The Jeffreys-Lindley paradox displays how the use of a p-value (or number of standard deviations z) in a frequentist hypothesis test can lead to an inference that is radically different from that of a Bayesian hypothesis test in the form…
Inference and estimation are fundamental in statistics, system identification, and machine learning. When prior knowledge about the system is available, Bayesian analysis provides a natural framework for encoding it through a prior…
We revisit the flatland paradox proposed by \cite{ston1976} which is an example of non-conglomerability. The aim of the paper is to show that the improperness of the prior is not directly involved in the inconsistency. First, we show that…
Consider the problem of high dimensional variable selection for the Gaussian linear model when the unknown error variance is also of interest. In this paper, we show that the use of conjugate shrinkage priors for Bayesian variable selection…
A central challenge in statistical inference is the presence of confounding variables that may distort observed associations between treatment and outcome. Conventional "causal" methods, grounded in assumptions such as ignorability, exclude…
In this paper we introduce objective proper prior distributions for hypothesis testing and model selection based on measures of divergence between the competing models; we call them divergence based (DB) priors. DB priors have simple forms…
A key sticking point of Bayesian analysis is the choice of prior distribution, and there is a vast literature on potential defaults including uniform priors, Jeffreys' priors, reference priors, maximum entropy priors, and weakly informative…