Related papers: Accomplice Manipulation of the Deferred Acceptance…
Decentralized planning is a key element of cooperative multi-agent systems for information gathering tasks. However, despite the high frequency of agent failures in realistic large deployment scenarios, current approaches perform poorly in…
In this paper, we propose a distributed algorithm to control a team of cooperating robots aiming to protect a target from a set of intruders. Specifically, we model the strategy of the defending team by means of an online optimization…
Machine learning algorithms often make decisions on behalf of agents with varied and sometimes conflicting interests. In domains where agents can choose to take their own action or delegate their action to a central mediator, an open…
Who gains and who loses from a manipulable school-choice mechanism? Studying the outcomes of sincere and sophisticated students under the manipulable Boston Mechanism as compared with the strategy-proof Deferred Acceptance, we provide…
We study the problem of online learning in competitive settings in the context of two-sided matching markets. In particular, one side of the market, the agents, must learn about their preferences over the other side, the firms, through…
In this work, we give a new technique for analyzing individualized privacy accounting via the following simple observation: if an algorithm is one-sided add-DP, then its subsampled variant satisfies two-sided DP. From this, we obtain…
Consider a matching problem on a graph where disjoint sets of vertices are privately owned by self-interested agents. An edge between a pair of vertices indicates compatibility and allows the vertices to match. We seek a mechanism to…
We propose an asynchronous, decentralized algorithm for consensus optimization. The algorithm runs over a network in which the agents communicate with their neighbors and perform local computation. In the proposed algorithm, each agent can…
Imitation is widely observed in populations of decision-making agents. Using our recent convergence results for asynchronous imitation dynamics on networks, we consider how such networks can be efficiently driven to a desired equilibrium…
In this work, we study a class of deception planning problems in which an agent aims to alter a security monitoring system's sensor readings so as to disguise its adversarial itinerary as an allowed itinerary in the environment. The…
Centralized assignment markets have historically relied on Deferred-Acceptance (DA) algorithms, which do not incorporate multiple objectives into the assignment. In this work, we propose an optimization-based many-to-one assignment…
We study the two-sided stable matching problem with one-sided uncertainty for two sets of agents A and B, with equal cardinality. Initially, the preference lists of the agents in A are given but the preferences of the agents in B are…
We consider the problem of stable matching with dynamic preference lists. At each time step, the preference list of some player may change by swapping random adjacent members. The goal of a central agency (algorithm) is to maintain an…
We study variants of the stable marriage and college admissions models in which the agents are allowed to express weak preferences over the set of agents on the other side of the market and the option of remaining unmatched. For the…
In this paper, we study a distributed privacy-preserving learning problem in social networks with general topology. The agents can communicate with each other over the network, which may result in privacy disclosure, since the…
With artificial intelligence systems becoming ubiquitous in our society, its designers will soon have to start to consider its social dimension, as many of these systems will have to interact among them to work efficiently. With this in…
Humans have come to rely on machines for reducing excessive information to manageable representations. But this reliance can be abused -- strategic machines might craft representations that manipulate their users. How can a user make good…
We present distributed algorithms that can be used by multiple agents to align their estimates with a particular value over a network with time-varying connectivity. Our framework is general in that this value can represent a consensus…
We study an online linear classification problem, in which the data is generated by strategic agents who manipulate their features in an effort to change the classification outcome. In rounds, the learner deploys a classifier, and an…
In considering the college admissions problem, almost fifty years ago, Gale and Shapley came up with a simple abstraction based on preferences of students and colleges. They introduced the concept of stability and optimality; and proposed…