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This document presents the security protocol verifier CryptoVerif.CryptoVerif does not rely on the symbolic, Dolev-Yao model, but on the computational model. It can verify secrecy, correspondence (which include authentication), and…
The Trusted Platform Module (TPM) version 2.0 provides a two-phase key exchange primitive which can be used to implement three widely-standardized authenticated key exchange protocols: the Full Unified Model, the Full MQV, and the SM2 key…
This thesis presents an automated method for verifying security properties of protocol implementations written in the C language. We assume that each successful run of a protocol follows the same path through the C code, justified by the…
The ubiquitous presence of mobile communication devices and the continuous development of mo- bile data applications, which results in high level of mobile devices' activity and exchanged data, often transparent to the user, makes privacy…
Automated verification of security protocols based on dynamic root of trust, typically relying on protected hardware such as TPM, involves several challenges that we address in this paper. We model the semantics of trusted computing…
Consider the problem of verifying security properties of a cryptographic protocol coded in C. We propose an automatic solution that needs neither a pre-existing protocol description nor manual annotation of source code. First, symbolically…
Quantum protocols such as the BB84 Quantum Key Distribution protocol exchange qubits to achieve information-theoretic security guarantees. Many variants thereof were proposed, some of them being already deployed. Existing security proofs in…
We propose a security verification framework for cryptographic protocols using machine learning. In recent years, as cryptographic protocols have become more complex, research on automatic verification techniques has been focused on. The…
Transparency protocols are protocols whose actions can be publicly monitored by observers (such observers may include regulators, rights advocacy groups, or the general public). The observed actions are typically usages of private keys such…
Current formal approaches have been successfully used to find design flaws in many security protocols. However, it is still challenging to automatically analyze protocols due to their large or infinite state spaces. In this paper, we…
In today's world, computer networks have become vulnerable to numerous attacks. In both wireless and wired networks, one of the most common attacks is man-in-the-middle attacks, within which session hijacking, context confusion attacks have…
In this paper, we consider the problem of verifying anonymity and unlinkability in the symbolic model, where protocols are represented as processes in a variant of the applied pi calculus, notably used in the ProVerif tool. Existing tools…
Allowing a compromised device to receive privacy-sensitive sensor readings, or to operate a safety-critical actuator, carries significant risk. Usually, such risks are mitigated by validating the device's security state with remote…
Formal verification is a critical process in ensuring the security and correctness of cryptographic protocols, particularly in high-assurance domains. This paper presents a comprehensive formal analysis of the Permission Voucher Protocol, a…
Cryptographic protocols play a fundamental role in securing modern digital infrastructure, but they are often deployed without prior formal verification. This could lead to the adoption of distributed systems vulnerable to attack vectors.…
Security is critical for everything relying on modern digital systems. Because almost all digital interactions are governed by the Internet and cryptographic protocols, these protocols must serve as reliable mechanisms that guarantee core…
Recently, various types of Text-to-Image (T2I) models have emerged (such as DALL-E and Stable Diffusion), and showing their advantages in different aspects. Therefore, some third-party service platforms collect different model interfaces…
The Trusted Platform Module (TPM) is a cryptoprocessor designed to protect integrity and security of modern computers. Communications with the TPM go through the TPM Software Stack (TSS), a popular implementation of which is the open-source…
Security of cryptographic protocols can be analysed by creating a model in a formal language and verifying the model in a tool. All such tools focus on the last part of the analysis, verification, and the interpretation of the specification…
Aiming for strong security assurance, recently there has been an increasing interest in formal verification of cryptographic constructions. This paper presents a mechanised formal verification of the popular Pedersen commitment protocol,…