Related papers: On the Resource Allocation for Political Campaigns
We develop an equilibrium theory of attention and politics. In a spatial model of electoral competition where candidates have varying policy preferences, we examine what kinds of political behaviors capture voters' limited attention and how…
Transmitters of a multiple access channel are assumed to freely choose their power control strategy in order to be energy-efficient. We show that in a stochastic game framework, we can develop energy-efficient distributed control strategies…
We investigate a voting scenario with two groups of agents whose preferences depend on a ground truth that cannot be directly observed. The majority's preferences align with the ground truth, while the minorities disagree. Focusing on…
We introduce the concept of budget games. Players choose a set of tasks and each task has a certain demand on every resource in the game. Each resource has a budget. If the budget is not enough to satisfy the sum of all demands, it has to…
This paper studies a communication game between an uninformed decision maker and two perfectly informed senders with conflicting interests. Senders can misreport information at a cost that increases with the size of the misrepresentation.…
Election data represent a precious source of information to study human behavior at a large scale. In proportional elections with open lists, the number of votes received by a candidate, rescaled by the average performance of all…
The decisions that human beings make to allocate time has significant bearing on economic output and to the sustenance of social networks. The time allocation problem motivates our formal analysis of the resource allocation game, where…
Tournaments are a widely used mechanism to rank alternatives in a noisy environment. This paper investigates a fundamental issue of economics in tournament design: what is the best usage of limited resources, that is, how should the…
Elections and opinion polls often have many candidates, with the aim to either rank the candidates or identify a small set of winners according to voters' preferences. In practice, voters do not provide a full ranking; instead, each voter…
In adversarial interactions, one is often required to make strategic decisions over multiple periods of time, wherein decisions made earlier impact a player's competitive standing as well as how choices are made in later stages. In this…
We propose a general framework for strategic voting when a voter may lack knowledge about other votes or about other voters' knowledge about her own vote. In this setting we define notions of manipulation and equilibrium. We also model…
We study a game played between advertisers in an online ad platform. The platform sells ad impressions by first-price auction and provides autobidding algorithms that optimize bids on each advertiser's behalf, subject to advertiser…
We consider a stochastic version of the well-known Blotto game, called the gladiator game. In this zero-sum allocation game two teams of gladiators engage in a sequence of one-to-one fights in which the probability of winning is a function…
We study mechanisms for candidate selection that seek to minimize the social cost, where voters and candidates are associated with points in some underlying metric space. The social cost of a candidate is the sum of its distances to each…
Efficient allocation is important in nature and human society, where individuals frequently compete for limited resources. The Minority Game (MG) is perhaps the simplest toy model to address this issue. However, most previous solutions…
We investigate the dynamics of the choice of an active strategy in the minority game. A history distribution is introduced as an analytical tool to study the asymmetry between the two choices offered to the agents. Its properties are…
Prediction is a well-studied machine learning task, and prediction algorithms are core ingredients in online products and services. Despite their centrality in the competition between online companies who offer prediction-based products,…
We study a variation of the minority game. There are N agents. Each has to choose between one of two alternatives everyday, and there is reward to each member of the smaller group. The agents cannot communicate with each other, but try to…
We study a class of stochastic dynamic games that exhibit strategic complementarities between players; formally, in the games we consider, the payoff of a player has increasing differences between her own state and the empirical…
The study of evolutionary games with pairwise local interactions has been of interest to many different disciplines. Also local interactions with multiple opponents had been considered, although always for a fixed amount of players. In many…