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We consider a number of questions related to tradeoffs between reward and regret in repeated gameplay between two agents. To facilitate this, we introduce a notion of $\textit{generalized equilibrium}$ which allows for asymmetric regret…
We investigate the repeated prisoner's dilemma game where both players alternately use reinforcement learning to obtain their optimal memory-one strategies. We theoretically solve the simultaneous Bellman optimality equations of…
Although recent work in AI has made great progress in solving large, zero-sum, extensive-form games, the underlying assumption in most past work is that the parameters of the game itself are known to the agents. This paper deals with the…
We study a game between liquidity provider and liquidity taker agents interacting in an over-the-counter market, for which the typical example is foreign exchange. We show how a suitable design of parameterized families of reward functions…
In many machine learning applications, there are multiple decision-makers involved, both automated and human. The interaction between these agents often goes unaddressed in algorithmic development. In this work, we explore a simple version…
Self-interested individuals often fail to cooperate, posing a fundamental challenge for multi-agent learning. How can we achieve cooperation among self-interested, independent learning agents? Promising recent work has shown that in certain…
The increasing adoption of Reinforcement Learning in safety-critical systems domains such as autonomous vehicles, health, and aviation raises the need for ensuring their safety. Existing safety mechanisms such as adversarial training,…
In this work, we develop a reinforcement learning protocol for a multiagent coordination task in a discrete state and action space: an iterated prisoner's dilemma game extended into a team based, winner-take all tournament, which forces the…
The universe involves many independent co-learning agents as an ever-evolving part of our observed environment. Yet, in practice, Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning (MARL) applications are typically constrained to small, homogeneous…
A key challenge in the study of multiagent cooperation is the need for individual agents not only to cooperate effectively, but to decide with whom to cooperate. This is particularly critical in situations when other agents have hidden,…
This paper addresses a mathematically tractable model of the Prisoner's Dilemma using the framework of active inference. In this work, we design pairs of Bayesian agents that are tracking the joint game state of their and their opponent's…
Matrix games like Prisoner's Dilemma have guided research on social dilemmas for decades. However, they necessarily treat the choice to cooperate or defect as an atomic action. In real-world social dilemmas these choices are temporally…
Cooperation between self-interested individuals is a widespread phenomenon in the natural world, but remains elusive in interactions between artificially intelligent agents. Instead, naive reinforcement learning algorithms typically…
We examine the effects of memory and different updating paradigms in a game-theoretic model of competitive learning, where agents are influenced in their choice of strategy by both the choices made by, and the consequent success rates of,…
Cooperation is the foundation of ecosystems and the human society, and the reinforcement learning provides crucial insight into the mechanism for its emergence. However, most previous work has mostly focused on the self-organization at the…
Social dilemmas have been widely studied to explain how humans are able to cooperate in society. Considerable effort has been invested in designing artificial agents for social dilemmas that incorporate explicit agent motivations that are…
In some agent designs like inverse reinforcement learning an agent needs to learn its own reward function. Learning the reward function and optimising for it are typically two different processes, usually performed at different stages. We…
Learning With Opponent-Learning Awareness (LOLA) (Foerster et al. [2018a]) is a multi-agent reinforcement learning algorithm that typically learns reciprocity-based cooperation in partially competitive environments. However, LOLA often…
Despite the considerable success enjoyed by machine learning techniques in practice, numerous studies demonstrated that many approaches are vulnerable to attacks. An important class of such attacks involves adversaries changing features at…
Learning to cooperate with other agents is challenging when those agents also possess the ability to adapt to our own behavior. Practical and theoretical approaches to learning in cooperative settings typically assume that other agents'…