Related papers: Testable Implications of Multiple Equilibria in Di…

We provide a syntactic construction of correlated equilibrium. For any finite game, we study how players coordinate their play on a signal by means of a public strategy whose instructions are expressed in some natural language. Language can…

Learning problems commonly exhibit an interesting feedback mechanism wherein the population data reacts to competing decision makers' actions. This paper formulates a new game theoretic framework for this phenomenon, called "multi-player…

Stackelberg equilibria have become increasingly important as a solution concept in computational game theory, largely inspired by practical problems such as security settings. In practice, however, there is typically uncertainty regarding…

We construct several definitions of imbalance and playability, both of which are related to the existence of dominated strategies. Specifically, a maximally balanced game and a playable game cannot have dominated strategies for any player.…

The behaviour of multi-agent learning in many player games has been shown to display complex dynamics outside of restrictive examples such as network zero-sum games. In addition, it has been shown that convergent behaviour is less likely to…

We extend the indirect evolutionary approach to the selection of (possibly misspecified) models. Agents with different models match in pairs to play a stage game, where models define feasible beliefs about game parameters and about others'…

This article introduces differential hybrid games, which combine differential games with hybrid games. In both kinds of games, two players interact with continuous dynamics. The difference is that hybrid games also provide all the features…

We consider mean field games with discrete state spaces (called discrete mean field games in the following) and we analyze these games in continuous and discrete time, over finite as well as infinite time horizons. We prove the existence of…

We study the problem of characterizing the set of games that are consistent with observed equilibrium play. Our contribution is to develop and analyze a new methodology based on convex optimization to address this problem for many classes…

This work establishes sufficient conditions for existence of saddle points in discrete Markov games. The result reveals the relation between dynamic games and static games using dynamic programming equations. This result enables us to prove…

Coordination games have been of interest to game theorists, economists, and ecologists for many years to study such problems as the emergence of local conventions and the evolution of cooperative behavior. Approaches for understanding the…

Although mixed extensions of finite games always admit equilibria, this is not the case for countable games, the best-known example being Wald's pick-the-larger-integer game. Several authors have provided conditions for the existence of…

We consider continuous-time mean-field stochastic games with strategic complementarities. The interaction between the representative productive firm and the population of rivals comes through the price at which the produced good is sold and…

This paper studies a potential outcome model with a continuous or discrete outcome, a discrete multi-valued treatment, and a discrete multi-valued instrument. We derive sharp, closed-form testable implications for a class of restrictions on…

The strategic selection of resources by selfish agents has long been a key area of research, with Resource Selection Games and Congestion Games serving as prominent examples. In these traditional frameworks, agents choose from a set of…

This paper develops a unified framework for testing monotonicity of Bayesian Nash equilibrium strategies in unobserved types in games of incomplete information. We show that, under symmetric independent private types, monotonicity of…

We study infinitely repeated games in settings of imperfect monitoring. We first prove a family of theorems that show that when the signals observed by the players satisfy a condition known as $(\epsilon, \gamma)$-differential privacy, that…

We investigate whether having a unique equilibrium (or a given number of equilibria) is robust to perturbation of the payoffs, both for Nash equilibrium and correlated equilibrium. We show that the set of n-player finite games with a unique…

In dynamic noncooperative games, each player makes conjectures about other players' reactions before choosing a strategy. However, resulting equilibria may be multiple and do not always lead to desirable outcomes. These issues are typically…

This paper proposes a new equilibrium concept "robust perfect equilibrium" for non-cooperative games with a continuum of players, incorporating three types of perturbations. Such an equilibrium is shown to exist (in symmetric mixed…