Related papers: On the Challenges of Detecting Side-Channel Attack…
Side-channel information leakage is a known limitation of SGX. Researchers have demonstrated that secret-dependent information can be extracted from enclave execution through page-fault access patterns. Consequently, various recent research…
Intel has introduced a trusted computing technology, Intel Software Guard Extension (SGX), which provides an isolated and secure execution environment called enclave for a user program without trusting any privilege software (e.g., an…
Side-channel risks of Intel's SGX have recently attracted great attention. Under the spotlight is the newly discovered page-fault attack, in which an OS-level adversary induces page faults to observe the page-level access patterns of a…
Intel SGX is known to be vulnerable to a class of practical attacks exploiting memory access pattern side-channels, notably page-fault attacks and cache timing attacks. A promising hardening scheme is to wrap applications in hardware…
This paper presents SgxPectre Attacks that exploit the recently disclosed CPU bugs to subvert the confidentiality and integrity of SGX enclaves. Particularly, we show that when branch prediction of the enclave code can be influenced by…
Recent research has demonstrated that Intel's SGX is vulnerable to software-based side-channel attacks. In a common attack, the adversary monitors CPU caches to infer secret-dependent data accesses patterns. Known defenses have major…
In modern computing environments, hardware resources are commonly shared, and parallel computation is widely used. Parallel tasks can cause privacy and security problems if proper isolation is not enforced. Intel proposed SGX to create a…
In this paper, we explore a new, yet critical, side-channel attack against Intel Software Guard Extension (SGX), called a branch shadowing attack, which can reveal fine-grained control flows (i.e., each branch) of an enclave program running…
In modern computer systems, user processes are isolated from each other by the operating system and the hardware. Additionally, in a cloud scenario it is crucial that the hypervisor isolates tenants from other tenants that are co-located on…
We introduce a new timing side-channel attack on Intel CPU processors. Our Frontal attack exploits timing differences that arise from how the CPU frontend fetches and processes instructions while being interrupted. In particular, we observe…
Intel SGX enables memory isolation and static integrity verification of code and data stored in user-space memory regions called enclaves. SGX effectively shields the execution of enclaves from the underlying untrusted OS. Attackers cannot…
We present a kernel-level infrastructure that allows system-wide detection of malicious applications attempting to exploit cache-based side-channel attacks to break the process confinement enforced by standard operating systems. This…
New hardware primitives such as Intel SGX secure a user-level process in presence of an untrusted or compromised OS. Such "enclaved execution" systems are vulnerable to several side-channels, one of which is the page fault channel. In this…
Intel Software Guard Extensions (SGX) is a promising hardware-based technology for protecting sensitive computations from potentially compromised system software. However, recent research has shown that SGX is vulnerable to branch-shadowing…
The deep learning revolution has been enabled in large part by GPUs, and more recently accelerators, which make it possible to carry out computationally demanding training and inference in acceptable times. As the size of machine learning…
Intel SGX (Software Guard Extension) is a promising TEE (trusted execution environment) technique that can protect programs running in user space from being maliciously accessed by the host operating system. Although it provides hardware…
To protect cryptographic implementations from side-channel vulnerabilities, developers must adopt constant-time programming practices. As these can be error-prone, many side-channel detection tools have been proposed. Despite this, such…
Intel Software Guard Extension (SGX) offers software applications enclave to protect their confidentiality and integrity from malicious operating systems. The SSL/TLS protocol, which is the de facto standard for protecting transport-layer…
A protocol for two-party secure function evaluation (2P-SFE) aims to allow the parties to learn the output of function $f$ of their private inputs, while leaking nothing more. In a sense, such a protocol realizes a trusted oracle that…
Intel's Software Guard Extensions (SGX) introduced new instructions to switch the processor to enclave mode which protects it from introspection. While the enclave mode strongly protects the memory and the state of the processor, it cannot…