Related papers: A reputation game on cyber-security and cyber-risk…

In security games, the solution concept commonly used is that of a Stackelberg equilibrium where the defender gets to commit to a mixed strategy. The motivation for this is that the attacker can repeatedly observe the defender's actions and…

We study strategic interaction in data-driven games where players face uncertainty about payoff distributions inferred from finite samples. To model calibrated attitudes toward such uncertainty, we formulate distributionally robust games…

We explore a scenario involving two sites and a sequential game between a defender and an attacker, where the defender is responsible for securing the sites while the attacker aims to attack them. Each site holds a loss value for the…

As cyber-attacks show to be more and more complex and coordinated, cyber-defenders strategy through multi-agent approaches could be key to tackle against cyber-attacks as close as entry points in a networked system. This paper presents a…

Attack detection is usually approached as a classification problem. However, standard classification tools often perform poorly because an adaptive attacker can shape his attacks in response to the algorithm. This has led to the recent…

In this work, we introduce a game-theoretic model that assesses the cyber-security risk of cloud networks and informs security experts on the optimal security strategies. Our approach combines game theory, combinatorial optimization, and…

An abundance of recent impossibility results establish that regret minimization in Markov games with adversarial opponents is both statistically and computationally intractable. Nevertheless, none of these results preclude the possibility…

I study a repeated game in which a patient player (e.g., a seller) wants to win the trust of some myopic opponents (e.g., buyers) but can strictly benefit from betraying them. Her benefit from betrayal is strictly positive and is her…

We present a strategic analysis of a trust model that has recently been proposed for promoting cooperative behaviour in user-centric networks. The mechanism for cooperation is based on a combination of reputation and virtual currency…

The concept of active cyber defense has been proposed for years. However, there are no mathematical models for characterizing the effectiveness of active cyber defense. In this paper, we fill the void by proposing a novel Markov process…

Proactive cyber-risk assessment is gaining momentum due to the wide range of sectors that can benefit from the prevention of cyber-incidents by preserving integrity, confidentiality, and the availability of data. The rising attention to…

In this study, we present models where participants strategically select their risk levels and earn corresponding rewards, mirroring real-world competition across various sectors. Our analysis starts with a normal form game involving two…

To protect the systems exposed to the Internet against attacks, a security system with the capability to engage with the attacker is needed. There have been attempts to model the engagement/interactions between users, both benign and…

We study a modified version of the Naming Game, a recently introduced model which describes how shared vocabulary can emerge spontaneously in a population without any central control. In particular, we introduce a new mechanism that allows…

We study two-sided reputational bargaining with opportunities to issue an ultimatum -- threats to force dispute resolution. Each player is either a justified type, who never concedes and issues an ultimatum whenever an opportunity arrives,…

In the contemporary digital landscape, cybersecurity has become a critical issue due to the increasing frequency and sophistication of cyber attacks. This study utilizes a non-zero-sum game theoretical framework to model the strategic…

Markov games with coupling constraints model constrained dynamical decision-making involving self-interested agents, where the feasibility of an individual agent's strategy depends on the joint strategies of the others. Such games arise in…

In this work we explore the implementation of the reputation system for a generic marketplace, describe details of the algorithm and parameters driving its operation, justify an approach to simulation modeling, and explore how various kinds…

We study a repeated sender-receiver game where inspections are public but the sender's action is hidden unless inspected. A detected deception ends the relationship or triggers a finite punishment. We show the public state is one…

In this work we apply methods from cryptography to enable any number of mutually distrusting players to implement broad classes of mediated equilibria of strategic games without the need for trusted mediation. Our implementation makes use…