Related papers: On Parameterized Complexity of Liquid Democracy
The paper provides an analysis of the voting method known as delegable proxy voting, or liquid democracy. The analysis first positions liquid democracy within the theory of binary aggregation. It then focuses on two issues of the system:…
In recent years, the study of various models and questions related to Liquid Democracy has been of growing interest among the community of Computational Social Choice. A concern that has been raised, is that current academic literature…
In this paper, we investigate the so-called ODP-problem that has been formulated by Caragiannis and Micha [10]. Here, we are in a setting with two election alternatives out of which one is assumed to be correct. In ODP, the goal is to…
In this study, we propose a generalization of the classic model of liquid democracy that allows fractional delegation of voting weight, while simultaneously allowing for the existence of equilibrium states. Our approach empowers agents to…
We introduce Flexible Representative Democracy (FRD), a novel hybrid of Representative Democracy (RD) and Direct Democracy (DD) in which voters can alter the issue-dependent weights of a set of elected representatives. In line with the…
We examine an approval-based model of Liquid Democracy with a budget constraint on voting and delegating costs, aiming to centrally select casting voters ensuring complete representation of the electorate. From a computational complexity…
Viscous democracy is a generalization of liquid democracy, a social choice framework in which voters may transitively delegate their votes. In viscous democracy, a "viscosity" factor decreases the weight of a delegation the further it…
To make a joint decision, agents (or voters) are often required to provide their preferences as linear orders. To determine a winner, the given linear orders can be aggregated according to a voting protocol. However, in realistic settings,…
The paper proposes an analysis of liquid democracy (or, delegable proxy voting) from the perspective of binary aggregation and of binary diffusion models. We show how liquid democracy on binary issues can be embedded into the framework of…
Consider elections where the set of candidates is partitioned into parties, and each party must nominate exactly one candidate. The Possible President problem asks whether some candidate of a given party can become the winner of the…
Partitioning a region into districts to favor a particular candidate or a party is commonly known as gerrymandering. In this paper, we investigate the gerrymandering problem in graph theoretic setting as proposed by Cohen-Zemach et al.…
The traditional election control problem focuses on the use of control to promote a single candidate. In parliamentary elections, however, the focus shifts: voters care no less about the overall governing coalition than the individual…
We study the parameterized control complexity of fallback voting, a voting system that combines preference-based with approval voting. Electoral control is one of many different ways for an external agent to tamper with the outcome of an…
The NP-hard Metric Dimension problem is to decide for a given graph G and a positive integer k whether there is a vertex subset of size at most k that separates all vertex pairs in G. Herein, a vertex v separates a pair {u,w} if the…
The computational study of elections generally assumes that the preferences of the electorate come in as a list of votes. Depending on the context, it may be much more natural to represent the list succinctly, as the distinct votes of the…
We introduce new power indices to measure the a priori voting power of voters in liquid democracy elections where an underlying network restricts delegations. We argue that our power indices are natural extensions of the standard…
Roughly speaking, gerrymandering is the systematic manipulation of the boundaries of electoral districts to make a specific (political) party win as many districts as possible. While typically studied from a geographical point of view,…
The cyclability of a graph is the maximum integer $k$ for which every $k$ vertices lie on a cycle. The algorithmic version of the problem, given a graph $G$ and a non-negative integer $k,$ decide whether the cyclability of $G$ is at least…
We investigate the parameterized complexity of several problems formalizing cluster identification in graphs. In other words we ask whether a graph contains a large enough and sufficiently connected subgraph. We study here three relaxations…
We introduce a voting model with multi-agent ranked delegations. This model generalises liquid democracy in two aspects: first, an agent's delegation can use the votes of multiple other agents to determine their own -- for instance, an…