Related papers: Persuading a Wishful Thinker
This paper introduces a novel criterion, persuasiveness, to select equilibria in signaling games. In response to the Stiglitz critique, persuasiveness focuses on the comparison across equilibria. An equilibrium is more persuasive than an…
We study an information design problem in transportation networks, in the presence of a random state that affects the travel times on the links. An omniscient system planner -- aiming at reducing congestion -- observes the network state…
When collaborating with multiple parties, communicating relevant information is of utmost importance to efficiently completing the tasks at hand. Under active inference, communication can be cast as sharing beliefs between free-energy…
A principal delegates decisions to a biased agent. Payoffs depend on a state that the principal cannot observe. Initially, the agent does not observe the state, but he can acquire information about it at a cost. We characterize the…
We study Bayesian persuasion under approximate best response, where the receiver may choose any action that is not too much suboptimal given their posterior belief upon receiving the signal. We focus on the computational aspects of the…
Persuasion is an important and yet complex aspect of human intelligence. When undertaken through dialogue, the deployment of good arguments, and therefore counterarguments, clearly has a significant effect on the ability to be successful in…
Classical Bayesian persuasion studies how a sender influences receivers through carefully designed signaling policies within a single strategic interaction. In many real-world environments, such interactions are repeated across multiple…
This paper develops a theory of learning under ambiguity induced by the decision maker's beliefs about the collection of data correlated with the true state of the world. Within our framework, two classical results on Bayesian learning…
This work is a technical approach to modeling false information nature, design, belief impact and containment in multi-agent networks. We present a Bayesian mathematical model for source information and viewer's belief, and how the former…
We study a model of a population making a binary decision based on information spreading within the population, which is fully connected or covering a square grid. We assume that a fraction of the population wants to make the choice of the…
Persuasion is a fundamental aspect of communication, influencing decision-making across diverse contexts, from everyday conversations to high-stakes scenarios such as politics, marketing, and law. The rise of conversational AI systems has…
I study the optimal provision of information in a long-term relationship between a sender and a receiver. The sender observes a persistent, evolving state and commits to send signals over time to the receiver, who sequentially chooses…
One of the core challenges in Visual Dialogue problems is asking the question that will provide the most useful information towards achieving the required objective. Encouraging an agent to ask the right questions is difficult because we…
Deception is a technique to mislead human or computer systems by manipulating beliefs and information. Successful deception is characterized by the information-asymmetric, dynamic, and strategic behaviors of the deceiver and the deceivee.…
We propose a dynamic product adoption persuasion model involving an impatient partially informed sender who gradually learns the state. In this model, the sender gathers information over time, and hence her posteriors' sequence forms a…
A recent approach based on Bayesian inverse planning for the "theory of mind" has shown good performance in modeling human cognition. However, perfect inverse planning differs from human cognition during one kind of complex tasks due to…
This paper considers the dynamics of cheap talk interactions between an oblivious receiver and a sender with different amounts of information. Even though it may seem that having additional information about the state of the game is always…
Law enforcement acquires costly evidence with the aim of securing the conviction of a defendant, who is convicted if a decision-maker's belief exceeds a certain threshold. Either law enforcement or the decision-maker is biased and is…
I introduce a model of predictive scoring. A receiver wants to predict a sender's quality. An intermediary observes multiple features of the sender and aggregates them into a score. Based on the score, the receiver makes a decision. The…
We study a Bayesian persuasion problem with externalities. In this model, a principal sends signals to inform multiple agents about the state of the world. Simultaneously, due to the existence of externalities in the agents' utilities, the…