Related papers: Competitive Location Problems: Balanced Facility L…
We consider a truthful facility location problem in which there is a set of agents with private locations on the line of real numbers, and the goal is to place a number of facilities at different locations chosen from the set of those…
In this paper, we study a truthful two-obnoxious-facility location problem, in which each agent has a private location in [0, 1] and a public optional preference over two obnoxious facilities, and there is a minimum distance constraint d…
Facility location games have been a topic of major interest in economics, operations research and computer science, starting from the seminal work by Hotelling. In the classical pure location Hotelling game businesses compete for maximizing…
In this paper, we study the two-facility location game on a line with optional preference where the acceptable set of facilities for each agent could be different and an agent's cost is his distance to the closest facility within his…
We study a non-cooperative two-sided facility location game in which facilities and clients behave strategically. This is in contrast to many other facility location games in which clients simply visit their closest facility. Facility…
We consider a four-player game on the discrete hypercube $Q_n = \{0,1\}^n$, where each of the four players has chosen a single vertex of the hypercube. Such a position is called a profile. Imagine there is a voter at every vertex, and each…
We study the impact on mechanisms for facility location of moving from one dimension to two (or more) dimensions and Euclidean or Manhattan distances. We consider three fundamental axiomatic properties: anonymity which is a basic fairness…
We study a continuous facility location problem on a graph where all edges have unit length and where the facilities may also be positioned in the interior of the edges. The goal is to position as many facilities as possible subject to the…
We consider the facility location problem in a metric space, focusing on the case of three agents. We show that selecting the reported location of each agent with probability proportional to the distance between the other two agents results…
Voronoi tessellations are standard in spatial planning for assigning service areas based on Euclidean proximity, underpinning regulatory frameworks like the proximity principle in waste management. However, in regions with complex…
We study a class of location games where players want to attract as many resources as possible and pay a cost when deviating from an exogenous reference location. This class of games includes political competitions between policy-interested…
Facility location games provide an abstract model of mechanism design. In such games, a mechanism takes a profile of $n$ single-peaked preferences over an interval as an input and determines the location of a facility on the interval. In…
Let $V$ be a multiset of $n$ points in $\mathbb{R}^d$, which we call voters, and let $k\geq 1$ and $\ell\geq 1$ be two given constants. We consider the following game, where two players $\mathcal{P}$ and $\mathcal{Q}$ compete over the…
We study social cost losses in Facility Location games, where $n$ selfish agents install facilities over a network and connect to them, so as to forward their local demand (expressed by a non-negative weight per agent). Agents using the…
We consider competitive facility location as a two-stage multi-agent system with two types of clients. For a given host graph with weighted clients on the vertices, first facility agents strategically select vertices for opening their…
We study the classic facility location setting, where we are given $n$ clients and $m$ possible facility locations in some arbitrary metric space, and want to choose a location to build a facility. The exact same setting also arises in…
The facility location with strategic agents is a canonical problem in the literature on mechanism design without money. Recently, Agrawal et. al. considered this problem in the context of machine learning augmented algorithms, where the…
The Voronoi diagram is a geometric object which is widely used in many areas. Recently it has been shown that under mild conditions Voronoi diagrams have a certain continuity property: small perturbations of the sites yield small…
We revisit the discrete heterogeneous two-facility location problem, in which there is a set of agents that occupy nodes of a line graph, and have private approval preferences over two facilities. When the facilities are located at some…
This paper studies a spatial competition game between two firms that sell a homogeneous good at some pre-determined fixed price. A population of consumers is spread out over the real line, and the two firms simultaneously choose location in…