Related papers: Fractional Matchings under Preferences: Stability …
We study the problem of finding "fair" stable matchings in the Stable Marriage problem with Incomplete lists (SMI). In particular, we seek stable matchings that are optimal with respect to profile, which is a vector that indicates the…
A group of $n$ agents with numerical preferences for each other are to be assigned to the $n$ seats of a dining table. We study two natural topologies:~circular (cycle) tables and panel (path) tables. For a given seating arrangement, an…
We consider a monopolistic seller in a market that may be segmented. The surplus of each consumer in a segment depends on the price that the seller optimally charges, which depends on the set of consumers in the segment. We study which…
The present article considers stability of the solutions to nonlinear and nonautonomous compartmental systems governed by ordinary differential equations (ODEs). In particular, compartmental systems with a right-hand side that can be…
We consider a variant of socially stable marriage problem where preference lists may be incomplete, may contain ties and may have bounded length. In real world application like NRMP and Scottish medical matching scheme such restrictions…
The Stable Marriage Problem, as proposed by Gale and Shapley, considers producing a bipartite matching between two equally sized sets of boys (proposers) and respectively girls (acceptors), each member having a total preference order over…
The stable marriage (SM) problem has a wide variety of practical applications, ranging from matching resident doctors to hospitals, to matching students to schools, or more generally to any two-sided market. In the classical formulation, n…
We study the formation of stable outcomes via simple dynamics in cardinal hedonic games, where the utilities of agents change over time depending on the history of the coalition formation process. Specifically, we analyze situations where…
Federated learning is a distributed learning paradigm where multiple agents, each only with access to local data, jointly learn a global model. There has recently been an explosion of research aiming not only to improve the accuracy rates…
We study a variation of the Stable Marriage problem, where every man and every woman express their preferences as preference lists which may be incomplete and contain ties. This problem is called the Stable Marriage problem with Ties and…
The Balanced Stable Marriage problem is a central optimization version of the classic Stable Marriage problem. Here, the output cannot be an arbitrary stable matching, but one that balances between the dissatisfaction of the two parties,…
The set of stable matchings induces a distributive lattice. The supremum of the stable matching lattice is the boy-optimal (girl-pessimal) stable matching and the infimum is the girl-optimal (boy-pessimal) stable matching. The classical…
Super-stability and strong stability are properties of a matching in the stable matching problem with ties. In this paper, we introduce a common generalization of super-stability and strong stability, which we call non-uniform stability.…
We consider a model of stable edge sets (``matchings'') in a bipartite graph $G=(V,E)$ in which the preferences for vertices of one side (``firms'') are given via choice functions subject to standard axioms of consistency, substitutability…
In the roommate matching model, given a set of 2n agents and n rooms, we find an assignment of a pair of agents to a room. Although the roommate matching problem is well studied, the study of the model when agents have preference over both…
We extend the definition of $n$-dimensional difference equations to complex order $\alpha\in \mathbb{C} $. We investigate the stability of linear systems defined by an $n$-dimensional matrix $A$ and derive conditions for the stability of…
To guarantee all agents are matched in general, the classic Deferred Acceptance algorithm needs complete preference lists. In practice, preference lists are short, yet stable matching still works well. This raises two questions: $\bullet$…
We study (coalitional) exchange stability, which Alcalde [Economic Design, 1995] introduced as an alternative solution concept for matching markets involving property rights, such as assigning persons to two-bed rooms. Here, a matching of a…
Incomplete pairwise comparison matrices offer a natural way of expressing preferences in decision making processes. Although ordinal information is crucial, there is a bias in the literature: cardinal models dominate. Ordinal models usually…
Consensus control of multiagent systems arises in various robotic applications such as rendezvous and formation control. For example, to compute the control inputs of individual agents, the difference in the positions in aligned coordinate…