Related papers: Separating the Communication Complexity of Truthfu…

Determining the randomized (or distributional) communication complexity of disjointness is a central problem in communication complexity, having roots in the foundational work of Babai, Frankl, and Simon in the 1980s and culminating in the…

This paper provides the first general technique for proving information lower bounds on two-party unbounded-rounds communication problems. We show that the discrepancy lower bound, which applies to randomized communication complexity, also…

This paper studies a joint design problem where a seller can design both the signal structures for the agents to learn their values, and the allocation and payment rules for selling the item. In his seminal work, Myerson (1981) shows how to…

Byzantine Agreement (BA) is one of the most fundamental problems in distributed computing, and its communication complexity is an important efficiency metric. It is well known that quadratic communication is necessary for BA in the worst…

As Byzantine Agreement (BA) protocols find application in large-scale decentralized cryptocurrencies, an increasingly important problem is to design BA protocols with improved communication complexity. A few existing works have shown how to…

Traditional studies of combinatorial auctions often only consider linear constraints. The rise of smart grid presents a new class of auctions, characterized by quadratic constraints. This paper studies the {\em complex-demand knapsack…

We prove new bounds on the quantum communication complexity of the disjointness and equality problems. For the case of exact and non-deterministic protocols we show that these complexities are all equal to n+1, the previous best lower bound…

We study an extension of the standard two-party communication model in which Alice and Bob hold probability distributions $p$ and $q$ over domains $X$ and $Y$, respectively. Their goal is to estimate \[ \mathbb{E}_{x \sim p,\, y \sim…

We consider a revenue-maximizing seller with $m$ heterogeneous items and a single buyer whose valuation $v$ for the items may exhibit both substitutes (i.e., for some $S, T$, $v(S \cup T) < v(S) + v(T)$) and complements (i.e., for some $S,…

This paper introduces TEDI (Truthful, Expressive, and Dimension-Insensitive approach), a discretization-free algorithm to learn truthful and utility-maximizing mechanisms. Existing learning-based approaches often rely on discretization of…

We revisit the classic problem of fair division from a mechanism design perspective, using {\em Proportional Fairness} as a benchmark. In particular, we aim to allocate a collection of divisible items to a set of agents while incentivizing…

In this work we are concerned with the design of efficient mechanisms while eliciting limited information from the agents. First, we study the performance of sampling approximations in facility location games. Our key result is to show that…

We show nearly quadratic separations between two pairs of complexity measures: 1. We show that there is a Boolean function $f$ with $D(f)=\Omega((D^{sc}(f))^{2-o(1)})$ where $D(f)$ is the deterministic query complexity of $f$ and $D^{sc}$…

Results from the communication complexity literature have demonstrated that stable matching requires communication: one cannot find or verify a stable match without having access to essentially all of the ordinal preference information held…

We prove the existence of (one-way) communication tasks with a subconstant versus superconstant asymptotic gap, which we call "doubly infinite," between their quantum information and communication complexities. We do so by studying the…

A recent line of work in mechanism design has focused on guaranteeing incentive compatibility for agents without contingent reasoning skills: obviously strategyproof mechanisms guarantee that it is "obvious" for these imperfectly rational…

We study the following communication variant of local search. There is some fixed, commonly known graph $G$. Alice holds $f_A$ and Bob holds $f_B$, both are functions that specify a value for each vertex. The goal is to find a local maximum…

In communication complexity the input of a function $f:X\times Y\rightarrow Z$ is distributed between two players Alice and Bob. If Alice knows only $x\in X$ and Bob only $y\in Y$, how much information must Alice and Bob share to be able to…

We revisit the direct sum questions in communication complexity which asks whether the resource needed to solve $n$ communication problems together is (approximately) the sum of resources needed to solve these problems separately. Our work…

We study the computational complexity of computing Bayes-Nash equilibria in first-price auctions with discrete value distributions and discrete bidding space, under general subjective beliefs. It is known that such auctions do not always…