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We consider a symmetric $n$-player nonzero-sum stochastic differential game with controlled jumps and mean-field type interaction among the players. Each player minimizes some expected cost by affecting the drift as well as the jump part of…

We propose a new dynamics for equilibrium selection of finite player discrete strategy games. The dynamics is motivated by optimal transportation, and models individual players' myopicity, greedy and uncertainty when making decisions. The…

We consider a nonzero-sum N-player Markov game on an abstract measurable state space with compact metric action spaces. The payoff functions are bounded Carath\'eodory functions and the transitions of the system are assumed to have a…

Computing Nash equilibria for strategic multi-agent systems is challenging for expensive black box systems. Motivated by the ubiquity of games involving exploitation of common resources, this paper considers the above problem for potential…

In this paper we establish quantitative convergence results for both open and closed-loop Nash equilibria of N-player stochastic differential games in the setting of Mean Field Games of Controls (MFGC), a class of models where interactions…

We consider a class of N-player stochastic games of multi-dimensional singular control, in which each player faces a minimization problem of monotone-follower type with submodular costs. We call these games "monotone-follower games". In a…

This paper studies the competition among multiple fund managers with relative performance over the excess logarithmic return. Fund managers compete with each other and have expected utility or mean-variance criteria for excess logarithmic…

We develop a probabilistic approach to continuous-time finite state mean field games. Based on an alternative description of continuous-time Markov chain by means of semimartingale and the weak formulation of stochastic optimal control, our…

Even when confronted with the same data, agents often disagree on a model of the real-world. Here, we address the question of how interacting heterogenous agents, who disagree on what model the real-world follows, optimize their trading…

We consider two classes of constrained finite state-action stochastic games. First, we consider a two player nonzero sum single controller constrained stochastic game with both average and discounted cost criterion. We consider the same…

We show the convergence of finite state symmetric N-player differential games, where players control their transition rates from state to state, to a limiting dynamics given by a finite state Mean Field Game system made of two coupled…

Establishing the existence of Nash equilibria for partially observed stochastic dynamic games is known to be quite challenging, with the difficulties stemming from the noisy nature of the measurements available to individual players…

We consider stochastic differential games with $N$ players, linear-Gaussian dynamics in arbitrary state-space dimension, and long-time-average cost with quadratic running cost. Admissible controls are feedbacks for which the system is…

In this note we consider the following problem to study the effect of malicious players on the social optimum in load balancing games: Consider two players SOC and MAL controlling (1-f) and f fraction of the flow in a load balancing game.…

This paper investigates open-loop and feedback solutions of linear quadratic mean field (MF) games with a leader and a large number of followers. The leader first gives its strategy and then all the followers cooperate to optimize the…

Pseudo-games are a natural and well-known generalization of normal-form games, in which the actions taken by each player affect not only the other players' payoffs, as in games, but also the other players' strategy sets. The solution…

This work proposes a novel distributed approach for computing a Nash equilibrium in convex games with merely monotone and restricted strongly monotone pseudo-gradients. By leveraging the idea of the centralized operator extrapolation method…

This paper focuses on linear-quadratic (LQ for short) mean-field games described by forward-backward stochastic differential equations (FBSDEs for short), in which the individual control region is postulated to be convex. The decentralized…

We investigate mean field games for players, who are weakly coupled via their empirical measure. To this end we investigate time-dependent pure jump type propagators over a finite space in the framework of non-linear Markov processes. We…

We study a n-player and mean-field portfolio optimization problem under relative performance concerns with non-zero volatility, for wealth and consumption. The consistency assumption defining forward relative performance processes leads to…