Related papers: No-regret Learning in Price Competitions under Con…
We introduce the application of online learning in a Stackelberg game pertaining to a system with two learning agents in a dyadic exchange network, consisting of a supplier and retailer, specifically where the parameters of the demand…
This paper considers no-regret learning for repeated continuous-kernel games with lossy bandit feedback. Since it is difficult to give the explicit model of the utility functions in dynamic environments, the players' action can only be…
We study a demand response problem from utility (also referred to as operator)'s perspective with realistic settings, in which the utility faces uncertainty and limited communication. Specifically, the utility does not know the cost…
In this paper, we consider the problem of resource congestion control for competing online learning agents. On the basis of non-cooperative game as the model for the interaction between the agents, and the noisy online mirror ascent as the…
We study the limiting behavior of the mixed strategies that result from optimal no-regret learning strategies in a repeated game setting where the stage game is any 2 by 2 competitive game. We consider optimal no-regret algorithms that are…
Existing algorithms for online conformal prediction -- guaranteeing marginal coverage in adversarial settings -- are variants of online gradient descent (OGD), but their analyses of worst-case coverage do not follow from the regret…
In the setting of online learning, Implicit algorithms turn out to be highly successful from a practical standpoint. However, the tightest regret analyses only show marginal improvements over Online Mirror Descent. In this work, we shed…
In competitive supply chains (SCs), pricing decisions are crucial, as they directly impact market share and profitability. Traditional SC models often assume continuous pricing for mathematical convenience, overlooking the practical reality…
As algorithms increasingly mediate competitive decision-making, their influence extends beyond individual outcomes to shaping strategic market dynamics. In two preregistered experiments, we examined how algorithmic advice affects human…
This study is focused on periodic Fisher markets where items with time-dependent and stochastic values are regularly replenished and buyers aim to maximize their utilities by spending budgets on these items. Traditional approaches of…
Auctions with partially-revealed information about items are broadly employed in real-world applications, but the underlying mechanisms have limited theoretical support. In this work, we study a machine learning formulation of these types…
This paper studies the problem of maximizing revenue from a grid-scale battery energy storage system, accounting for uncertain future electricity prices and the effect of degradation on battery lifetime. We formulate this task as an online…
In the online non-stochastic control problem, an agent sequentially selects control inputs for a linear dynamical system when facing unknown and adversarially selected convex costs and disturbances. A common metric for evaluating control…
We design mechanisms for online procurement of data held by strategic agents for machine learning tasks. The challenge is to use past data to actively price future data and give learning guarantees even when an agent's cost for revealing…
Different types of dynamics have been studied in repeated game play, and one of them which has received much attention recently consists of those based on "no-regret" algorithms from the area of machine learning. It is known that dynamics…
Maintaining predictive accuracy in non-stationary environments requires online model selection to adapt autonomously to unknown distribution shifts. However, existing tuning-free algorithms face a fundamental trade-off between robustness…
We study the problem of pricing under a Multinomial Logit model where we incorporate network effects over the consumer's decisions. We analyse both cases, when sellers compete or collaborate. In particular, we pay special attention to the…
We study how to learn $\epsilon$-optimal strategies in zero-sum imperfect information games (IIG) with trajectory feedback. In this setting, players update their policies sequentially based on their observations over a fixed number of…
An open challenge in supervised learning is \emph{conceptual drift}: a data point begins as classified according to one label, but over time the notion of that label changes. Beyond linear autoregressive models, transfer and meta learning…
This work is concerned with the dynamics of online cultural markets, namely, attention allocation of many users on a set of digital goods with infinite supply. Such dynamic is important in shaping processes and outcomes in society, from…