Related papers: Timely Information from Prediction Markets
We study the power and limitations of posted prices in multi-unit markets, where agents arrive sequentially in an arbitrary order. We prove upper and lower bounds on the largest fraction of the optimal social welfare that can be guaranteed…
A competitive market is modeled as a game of incomplete information. One player observes some payoff-relevant state and can sell (possibly noisy) messages thereof to the other, whose willingness to pay is contingent on their own beliefs. We…
We present a novel methodology for identifying public knowledge and eliminating the biases it creates when aggregating information in small group settings. A two stage mechanism consisting of an information market and a coordination game is…
We present a novel methodology for predicting future outcomes that uses small numbers of individuals participating in an imperfect information market. By determining their risk attitudes and performing a nonlinear aggregation of their…
In collaborative data sharing and machine learning, multiple parties aggregate their data resources to train a machine learning model with better model performance. However, as the parties incur data collection costs, they are only willing…
A monopoly seller is privately and imperfectly informed about the buyer's value of the product. The seller uses information to price discriminate the buyer. A designer offers a mechanism that provides the seller with additional information…
Automated recommendations can nowadays be found on many e-commerce platforms, and such recommendations can create substantial value for consumers and providers. Often, however, not all recommendable items have the same profit margin, and…
The Artificial Prediction Market is a recent machine learning technique for multi-class classification, inspired from the financial markets. It involves a number of trained market participants that bet on the possible outcomes and are…
Online platforms in the Internet Economy commonly incorporate recommender systems that recommend products (or "arms") to users (or "agents"). A key challenge in this domain arises from myopic agents who are naturally incentivized to exploit…
We study the welfare effects of overreaction to information in the form of diagnostic expectations in markets with asymmetric information, and the effect of a simple intervention in the form of a tax or a subsidy. A large enough level of…
We study large markets with a single seller which can produce many types of goods, and many multi-minded buyers. The seller chooses posted prices for its many items, and the buyers purchase bundles to maximize their utility. For this…
This work investigates a dynamic variant of Bayesian persuasion, in which a strategic sender seeks to influence a receiver's belief over time through controlling the timing of the information disclosure, under resource constraints. We…
We develop a model of how information flows into a market, and derive algorithms for automatically detecting and explaining relevant events. We analyze data from twenty-two "political stock markets" (i.e., betting markets on political…
Designing a financial market that works well is very important for developing and maintaining an advanced economy, but is not easy because changing detailed rules, even ones that seem trivial, sometimes causes unexpected large impacts and…
We consider a setting where in a known future time, a certain continuous random variable will be realized. There is a public prediction that gradually converges to its realized value, and an expert that has access to a more accurate…
Collective intelligence is the ability of a group to perform more effectively than any individual alone. Diversity among group members is a key condition for the emergence of collective intelligence, but maintaining diversity is challenging…
Prediction markets are well-studied in the case where predictions are probabilities or expectations of future random variables. In 2008, Lambert, et al. proposed a generalization, which we call "scoring rule markets" (SRMs), in which…
We consider the design of private prediction markets, financial markets designed to elicit predictions about uncertain events without revealing too much information about market participants' actions or beliefs. Our goal is to design market…
An algorithm that outputs predictions about the state of the world will almost always be designed with the implicit or explicit goal of outputting accurate predictions (i.e., predictions that are likely to be true). In addition, the rise of…
Ranking models are typically designed to provide rankings that optimize some measure of immediate utility to the users. As a result, they have been unable to anticipate an increasing number of undesirable long-term consequences of their…