Related papers: Detector blinding attacks on counterfactual quantu…
In a two-way deterministic quantum key distribution (DQKD) protocol, Bob randomly prepares qubits in one of four states and sends them to Alice. To encode a bit, Alice performs an operation on each received qubit and returns it to Bob. Bob…
Quantum key distribution (QKD) and quantum message encryption protocols promise a secure way to distribute information while detecting eavesdropping. However, current protocols may suffer from significantly reduced eavesdropping protection…
In contrast to classical public-key cryptosystems, where the security of encoded messages relies on on computational assumptions, Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) enables two distant parties to establish a shared secret key that, when…
Blind quantum computing (BQC) is a promising application of distributed quantum systems, where a client can perform computations on a remote server without revealing any details of the applied circuit. While the most promising realizations…
Quantum key distribution (QKD) permits information-theoretically secure transmission of digital encryption keys, assuming that the behaviour of the devices employed for the key exchange can be reliably modelled and predicted. Remarkably, no…
We introduce a quantum key distribution protocol designed to expose fake users that connect to Alice or Bob for the purpose of monopolising the link and denying service. It inherently resists attempts to exhaust Alice and Bob's initial…
In theory, quantum key distribution (QKD) allows secure communications between two parties based on physical laws. However, most of the security proofs of QKD today make unrealistic assumptions and neglect many relevant device…
Quantum key distribution (QKD) provides information-theoretic security grounded in the fundamental laws of physics. Nevertheless, practical imperfections can introduce side channels that expose QKD systems to quantum hacking, especially…
Quantum key distribution (QKD) allows two distant parties to share secret keys with the proven security even in the presence of an eavesdropper with unbounded computational power. Recently, GHz-clock decoy QKD systems have been realized by…
How to remove detector side channel attacks has been a notoriously hard problem in quantum cryptography. Here, we propose a simple solution to this problem---*measurement* device independent quantum key distribution. It not only removes all…
Quantum key distribution is rising as an important cryptographic primitive for protecting the communication infrastructure in the digital era. However, its implementation security is often weakened by components whose behavior deviates from…
We report two key distribution schemes achieved by swapping quantum entanglement. Using two Bell states, two bits of secret key can be shared between two distant parties that play symmetric and equal roles. We also address eavesdropping…
Quantum key distribution (QKD) utilizes the laws of quantum mechanics to achieve information-theoretically secure key generation. This field is now approaching the stage of commercialization, but many practical QKD systems still suffer from…
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) is an innovative quantum communications protocol which exploits the laws of quantum mechanics to generate unconditionally secure cryptographic keying material between two geographically separated parties. The…
The security of the previous quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols, which is guaranteed by the nature of physics law, is based on the legitimate users. However, impersonation of the legitimate communicators by eavesdroppers, in practice,…
In recent years, several hacking attacks have broken the security of quantum cryptography implementations by exploiting the presence of losses and the ability of the eavesdropper to tune detection efficiencies. We present a simple attack of…
The single photon detection efficiency of the detector unit is crucial for the security of common quantum key distribution protocols like Bennett-Brassard 1984 (BB84). A low value for the efficiency indicates a possible eavesdropping attack…
Quantum mechanical complementarity ensures the security of the key-distribution scheme reported by Brassard and Bennet in 1984 (BB84), but does not prohibit use of multi-photons as a signal carrier. We describe a novel BB84 scheme in which…
Hydropower facilities are often remotely monitored or controlled from a centralized remote-control room. Additionally, major component manufacturers monitor the performance of installed components. While these communications enable…
We present strong attacks against quantum key distribution schemes which use quantum memories and quantum gates to attack directly the final key. We analyze a specific attack of this type, for which we find the density matrices available to…