Related papers: The evolution of punishing institutions
In the framework of evolutionary games with institutional reciprocity, limited incentives are at disposal for rewarding cooperators and punishing defectors. In the simplest case, it can be assumed that, depending on their strategies, all…
Experimental studies have shown the ubiquity of altruistic behavior in human societies. The social structure is a fundamental ingredient to understand the degree of altruism displayed by the members of a society, in contrast to…
Indirect reciprocity unveils how social cooperation is founded upon moral systems. Within the frame of dyadic games based on individual reputations, the "leading-eight" strategies distinguish themselves in promoting and sustaining…
This study investigates the effect of behavioral mistakes on the evolutionary stability of the cooperative equilibrium in a repeated public goods game. Many studies show that behavioral mistakes have detrimental effects on cooperation…
Understanding the evolution of human social systems requires flexible formalisms for the emergence of institutions. Although game theory is normally used to model interactions individually, larger spaces of games can be helpful for modeling…
Non-binding communication is common in daily life and crucial for fostering cooperation, even though it has no direct payoff consequences. However, despite robust empirical evidence, its evolutionary basis remains poorly understood. Here,…
The dilemma in cooperation is one of the major concerns in game theory. In a public-goods game, each individual pays a cost for cooperation, or to prevent defection, and receives a reward from the collected cost in a group. Thus, defection…
This paper characterizes how different incentive instruments shape cooperation in a repeated Prisoner`s Dilemma with a continuum of players. A simple tit-for-tat strategy competes against unconditional defection, and the long-run outcome is…
A binary game is introduced and analysed. N players have to choose one of the two sides independently and those on the minority side win. Players uses a finite set of ad hoc strategies to make their decision, based on the past record. The…
Cooperative behavior among unrelated individuals in human and animal societies represents a most intriguing puzzle to scientists in various disciplines. Here we present a simple yet effective mechanism promoting cooperation under full…
To achieve common goals, we often use joint commitments. Our commitment helps us to coordinate with our partners and assures them that their cooperative efforts will benefit themselves. However, if one of us can exploit the other's…
As large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed as autonomous agents, understanding their cooperation and social mechanisms is becoming increasingly important. In particular, how LLMs balance self-interest and collective…
How cooperation emerges in human societies is still a puzzle. Evolutionary game theory has been the standard framework to address this issue. In most models, every individual plays with all others, and then reproduce and die according to…
Punishment is probably the most frequently used mechanism to increase cooperation in Public Goods Games (PGG); however, it is expensive. To address this problem, this paper introduces an optimal control problem that uses fractional…
The Optional Public Goods Game is a three-strategy game in which an individual can play as a cooperator or defector or decide not to participate. Despite its simplicity, this model can effectively represent many human social dilemmas, such…
Across many domains of interaction, both natural and artificial, individuals use past experience to shape future behaviors. The results of such learning processes depend on what individuals wish to maximize. A natural objective is one's own…
Recent paradigm shifts from imitation learning to reinforcement learning (RL) is shown to be productive in understanding human behaviors. In the RL paradigm, individuals search for optimal strategies through interaction with the environment…
Understanding how cooperation emerges in public goods games is crucial for addressing societal challenges. While optional participation can establish cooperation without identifying cooperators, it relies on specific assumptions -- that…
The evolution of cooperation among unrelated individuals in human and animal societies remains a challenging issue across disciplines. It is an important subject also in the evolutionary game theory to understand how cooperation arises. The…
Partner selection is an important process in many social interactions, permitting individuals to decrease the risks associated with cooperation. In large populations, defectors may escape punishment by roving from partner to partner, but…