Related papers: Exploring the Security Boundary of Data Reconstruc…
Federated learning has emerged as a prominent privacy-preserving technique for leveraging large-scale distributed datasets by sharing gradients instead of raw data. However, recent studies indicate that private training data can still be…
Differentially private training offers a protection which is usually interpreted as a guarantee against membership inference attacks. By proxy, this guarantee extends to other threats like reconstruction attacks attempting to extract…
Data reconstruction attacks on trained neural networks aim to recover the data on which the network has been trained and pose a significant threat to privacy, especially if the training dataset contains sensitive information. Here, we…
The memorization of training data by neural networks raises pressing concerns for privacy and security. Recent work has shown that, under certain conditions, portions of the training set can be reconstructed directly from model parameters.…
In the effort to learn from extensive collections of distributed data, federated learning has emerged as a promising approach for preserving privacy by using a gradient-sharing mechanism instead of exchanging raw data. However, recent…
It has been demonstrated that very simple attacks can fool highly-sophisticated neural network architectures. In particular, so-called adversarial examples, constructed from perturbations of input data that are small or imperceptible to…
Being able to reconstruct training data from the parameters of a neural network is a major privacy concern. Previous works have shown that reconstructing training data, under certain circumstances, is possible. In this work, we analyse such…
Federated learning of deep learning models for supervised tasks, e.g. image classification and segmentation, has found many applications: for example in human-in-the-loop tasks such as film post-production where it enables sharing of domain…
We study what provable privacy attacks can be shown on trained, 2-layer ReLU neural networks. We explore two types of attacks; data reconstruction attacks, and membership inference attacks. We prove that theoretical results on the implicit…
Reconstruction attacks and defenses are essential in understanding the data leakage problem in machine learning. However, prior work has centered around empirical observations of gradient inversion attacks, lacks theoretical grounding, and…
Gradient descent (GD) type optimization schemes are the standard instruments to train fully connected feedforward artificial neural networks (ANNs) with rectified linear unit (ReLU) activation and can be considered as temporal…
Differentially private (DP) mechanisms are difficult to interpret and calibrate because existing methods for mapping standard privacy parameters to concrete privacy risks -- re-identification, attribute inference, and data reconstruction --…
Deep neural networks (DNNs) have been found to be vulnerable to backdoor attacks, raising security concerns about their deployment in mission-critical applications. While existing defense methods have demonstrated promising results, it is…
Reconstruction attacks allow an adversary to regenerate data samples of the training set using access to only a trained model. It has been recently shown that simple heuristics can reconstruct data samples from language models, making this…
Although federated learning improves privacy of training data by exchanging local gradients or parameters rather than raw data, the adversary still can leverage local gradients and parameters to obtain local training data by launching…
Federated learning has been proposed as a privacy-preserving machine learning framework that enables multiple clients to collaborate without sharing raw data. However, client privacy protection is not guaranteed by design in this framework.…
Gradient descent (GD) type optimization schemes are the standard methods to train artificial neural networks (ANNs) with rectified linear unit (ReLU) activation. Such schemes can be considered as discretizations of gradient flows (GFs)…
Machine unlearning is motivated by desire for data autonomy: a person can request to have their data's influence removed from deployed models, and those models should be updated as if they were retrained without the person's data. We show…
\ac{fl} proposed a distributed \ac{ml} framework where every distributed worker owns a complete copy of global model and their own data. The training is occurred locally, which assures no direct transmission of training data. However, the…
Given access to a machine learning model, can an adversary reconstruct the model's training data? This work studies this question from the lens of a powerful informed adversary who knows all the training data points except one. By…