Related papers: Solving Zero-Sum One-Sided Partially Observable St…

Stochastic patrol routing is known to be advantageous in adversarial settings; however, the optimal choice of stochastic routing strategy is dependent on a model of the adversary. We adopt a worst-case omniscient adversary model from the…

Many important real-world settings contain multiple players interacting over an unknown duration with probabilistic state transitions, and are naturally modeled as stochastic games. Prior research on algorithms for stochastic games has…

Autonomous agents should coordinate effectively without prior knowledge of others' intents. While prior work has focused on intent inference, we address the inverse problem: how agents can strategically demonstrate their intents within…

We present a new approach to solving games with a countably or uncountably infinite number of players. Such games are often used to model multiagent systems with a large number of agents. The latter are frequently encountered in economics,…

The paper introduces a generic approach to solving Sequential Security Games (SGs) which utilizes Evolutionary Algorithms. Formulation of the method (named EASG) is general and largely game-independent, which allows for its application to a…

We study the problem of finding equilibrium strategies in multi-agent games with incomplete payoff information, where the payoff matrices are only known to the players up to some bounded uncertainty sets. In such games, an ex-post…

In this paper, we study nonzero-sum separable games, which are continuous games whose payoffs take a sum-of-products form. Included in this subclass are all finite games and polynomial games. We investigate the structure of equilibria in…

Agents rarely act in isolation -- their behavioral history, in particular, is public to others. We seek a non-asymptotic understanding of how a leader agent should shape this history to its maximal advantage, knowing that follower agent(s)…

Stochastic two-player games model systems with an environment that is both adversarial and stochastic. The adversarial part of the environment is modeled by a player (Player 2) who tries to prevent the system (Player 1) from achieving its…

In mobile robotics and autonomous driving, it is natural to model agent interactions as the Nash equilibrium of a noncooperative, dynamic game. These methods inherently rely on observations from sensors such as lidars and cameras to…

The predominant paradigm in evolutionary game theory and more generally online learning in games is based on a clear distinction between a population of dynamic agents that interact given a fixed, static game. In this paper, we move away…

Game logic is a dynamic modal logic which models strategic two person games; it contains propositional dynamic logic (PDL) as a fragment. We propose an interpretation of game logic based on stochastic effectivity functions. A definition of…

Adversarial multiplayer games are an important object of study in multiagent learning. In particular, polymatrix zero-sum games are a multiplayer setting where Nash equilibria are known to be efficiently computable. Towards understanding…

We consider a two-player zero-sum stochastic differential game in which one of the players has a private information on the game. Both players observe each other, so that the non-informed player can try to guess his missing information. Our…

We consider a variant of the hide-and-seek game in which a seeker inspects multiple hiding locations to find multiple items hidden by a hider. Each hiding location has a maximum hiding capacity and a probability of detecting its hidden…

Some standardized environments have been designed for partially observable multi-agent cooperation, but we find most current environments are synchronous, whereas real-world agents often have their own action spaces leading to asynchrony.…

We propose a stochastic first-order algorithm to learn the rationality parameters of simultaneous and non-cooperative potential games, i.e., the parameters of the agents' optimization problems. Our technique combines (i.) an active-set step…

We study a class of stochastic dynamic games that exhibit strategic complementarities between players; formally, in the games we consider, the payoff of a player has increasing differences between her own state and the empirical…

Decision making in modern large-scale and complex systems such as communication networks, smart electricity grids, and cyber-physical systems motivate novel game-theoretic approaches. This paper investigates big strategic (non-cooperative)…

This paper is about a set-based computing method for solving a general class of two-player zero-sum Stackelberg differential games. We assume that the game is modeled by a set of coupled nonlinear differential equations, which can be…