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Invariant Causal Prediction (Peters et al., 2016) is a technique for out-of-distribution generalization which assumes that some aspects of the data distribution vary across the training set but that the underlying causal mechanisms remain…

Real-time bidding (RTB) has become a critical way of online advertising. In RTB, an advertiser can participate in bidding ad impressions to display its advertisements. The advertiser determines every impression's bidding price according to…

Reward models are critical for reinforcement learning from human feedback, as they determine the alignment quality and reliability of generative models. For complex tasks such as image editing, reward models are required to capture global…

Randomized mechanisms, which map a set of bids to a probability distribution over outcomes rather than a single outcome, are an important but ill-understood area of computational mechanism design. We investigate the role of randomized…

In an infinitely repeated general-sum pricing game, independent reinforcement learners may exhibit collusive behavior without any communication, raising concerns about algorithmic collusion. To better understand the learning dynamics, we…

Inverse reinforcement learning (IRL) addresses the problem of recovering a task description given a demonstration of the optimal policy used to solve such a task. The optimal policy is usually provided by an expert or teacher, making IRL…

Online advertisement is the main source of revenue for Internet business. Advertisers are typically ranked according to a score that takes into account their bids and potential click-through rates(eCTR). Generally, the likelihood that a…

Empirical Risk Minimization (ERM) based machine learning algorithms have suffered from weak generalization performance on data obtained from out-of-distribution (OOD). To address this problem, Invariant Risk Minimization (IRM) objective was…

Automatic prompt engineering aims to enhance the generation quality of large language models (LLMs). Recent works utilize feedbacks generated from erroneous cases to guide the prompt optimization. During inference, they may further retrieve…

Optimizing within the affine maximizer auctions (AMA) is an effective approach for revenue maximizing mechanism design. The AMA mechanisms are strategy-proof and individually rational (if the agents' valuations for the outcomes are…

We consider the problem of a single seller repeatedly selling a single item to a single buyer (specifically, the buyer has a value drawn fresh from known distribution $D$ in every round). Prior work assumes that the buyer is fully rational…

Reward models (RMs) are essential for aligning large language models (LLM) with human expectations. However, existing RMs struggle to capture the stochastic and uncertain nature of human preferences and fail to assess the reliability of…

Many real-world auctions are dynamic processes, in which bidders interact and report information over multiple rounds with the auctioneer. The sequential decision making aspect paired with imperfect information renders analyzing the…

Good economic mechanisms depend on the preferences of participants in the mechanism. For example, the revenue-optimal auction for selling an item is parameterized by a reserve price, and the appropriate reserve price depends on how much the…

The design of optimal auctions is a problem of interest in economics, game theory and computer science. Despite decades of effort, strategyproof, revenue-maximizing auction designs are still not known outside of restricted settings.…

The purpose of Inventory Pricing is to bid the right prices to online ad opportunities, which is crucial for a Demand-Side Platform (DSP) to win advertising auctions in Real-Time Bidding (RTB). In the planning stage, advertisers need the…

We study inverse reinforcement learning (IRL) and imitation learning (IM), the problems of recovering a reward or policy function from expert's demonstrated trajectories. We propose a new way to improve the learning process by adding a…

The efficient market hypothesis (EMH) famously stated that prices fully reflect the information available to traders. This critically depends on the transfer of information into prices through trading strategies. Traders optimise their…

We introduce a new numerical framework to learn optimal bidding strategies in repeated auctions when the seller uses past bids to optimize her mechanism. Crucially, we do not assume that the bidders know what optimization mechanism is used…

The successful application of machine learning (ML) methods becomes increasingly dependent on their interpretability or explainability. Designing explainable ML systems is instrumental to ensuring transparency of automated decision-making…