Related papers: Testing homogeneity in dynamic discrete games in f…

We establish the existence and uniqueness of distributed equilibria to possibly nonsymmetric $N$ player differential games with interactions through controls under displacement semimonotonicity assumptions. Surprisingly, the nonseparable…

In this paper we formulate the homogeneous two- and three-dimensional self-reconfiguration problem over discrete grids as a constrained potential game. We develop a game-theoretic learning algorithm based on the Metropolis-Hastings…

A basic question for zero-sum repeated games consists in determining whether the mean payoff per time unit is independent of the initial state. In the special case of "zero-player" games, i.e., of Markov chains equipped with additive…

We provide several tests to determine whether a game is a potential game or whether it is a zero-sum equivalent game---a game which is strategically equivalent to a zero-sum game in the same way that a potential game is strategically…

We consider a class of hierarchical noncooperative $N$-player games where the $i$th player solves a parametrized stochastic mathematical program with equilibrium constraints (MPEC) with the caveat that the implicit form of the $i$th…

In this paper, we provide exponential rates of convergence to the interior Nash equilibrium for continuous-time dual-space game dynamics such as mirror descent (MD) and actor-critic (AC). We perform our analysis in $N$-player continuous…

We show that in any $n$-player $m$-action normal-form game, we can obtain an approximate equilibrium by sampling any mixed-action equilibrium a small number of times. We study three types of equilibria: Nash, correlated and coarse…

The study of time-inhomogeneous Markov jump processes is a traditional topic within probability theory that has recently attracted substantial attention in various applications. However, their flexibility also incurs a substantial…

In this paper we study a type of games regularized by the relative entropy, where the players' strategies are coupled through a random environment variable. Besides the existence and the uniqueness of equilibria of such games, we prove that…

As part of an effort to apply the rigorous guarantees of formal verification to multi-agent systems, the field of equilibrium analysis, also called rational verification, studies equilibria in multiplayer games to reason about system-level…

The effect of population heterogeneity in multi-agent learning is practically relevant but remains far from being well-understood. Motivated by this, we introduce a model of multi-population learning that allows for heterogeneous beliefs…

We consider how an agent should update her uncertainty when it is represented by a set $\P$ of probability distributions and the agent observes that a random variable $X$ takes on value $x$, given that the agent makes decisions using the…

This paper considers mean field games in a multi-agent Markov decision process (MDP) framework. Each player has a continuum state and binary action, and benefits from the improvement of the condition of the overall population. Based on an…

We revisit the original hawk-dove game with slight modifications to payoff values while maintaining the fundamental principles of interaction. The practical robustness of the theoretical tools of game theory is tested on a simulated…

The problem of computing a common point that lies in the intersection of a finite number of closed convex sets, each known to one agent in a network, is studied. This issue, known as the distributed convex feasibility problem or the…

We study statistical model checking of continuous-time stochastic hybrid systems. The challenge in applying statistical model checking to these systems is that one cannot simulate such systems exactly. We employ the multilevel Monte Carlo…

In this paper, we consider the problem of sequential binary hypothesis test in adversary environment based on observations from s sensors, with the caveat that a subset of c sensors is compromised by an adversary, whose observations can be…

We consider a coalition formation setting where each agent belongs to one of the two types, and agents' preferences over coalitions are determined by the fraction of the agents of their own type in each coalition. This setting differs from…

Dynamic heterogeneity has often been modeled by assuming that a single-particle observable, fluctuating at a molecular scale, is influenced by its coupling to environmental variables fluctuating on a second, perhaps slower, time scale.…

We introduce a formal notion of masking fault-tolerance between probabilistic transition systems using stochastic games. These games are inspired in bisimulation games, but they also take into account the possible faulty behavior of…