Related papers: Timing Cache Accesses to Eliminate Side Channels i…

Cache timing attack is a type of side channel attack where the leaking timing information due to the cache behaviour of a crypto system is used by an attacker to break the system. Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) was considered a secure…

New hardware primitives such as Intel SGX secure a user-level process in presence of an untrusted or compromised OS. Such "enclaved execution" systems are vulnerable to several side-channels, one of which is the page fault channel. In this…

In this work, we study information leakage in timing side channels that arise in the context of shared event schedulers. Consider two processes, one of them an innocuous process (referred to as Alice) and the other a malicious one (referred…

Side-channel attacks impose a serious threat to cryptographic algorithms, including widely employed ones, such as AES and RSA. These attacks take advantage of the algorithm implementation in hardware or software to extract secret…

Side-channel attacks on shared hardware resources increasingly threaten confidentiality, especially with the rise of Large Language Models (LLMs). In this work, we introduce Spill The Beans, a novel application of cache side-channels to…

As cache-based side-channel attacks become serious security problems, various defenses have been proposed and deployed in both software and hardware. Consequently, cache-based side-channel attacks on processes co-residing on the same core…

Timing side channels in two-user schedulers are studied. When two users share a scheduler, one user may learn the other user's behavior from patterns of service timings. We measure the information leakage of the resulting timing side…

Global KV-cache sharing is an effective optimization for accelerating large language model (LLM) inference, yet it introduces an API-visible timing side channel that lets adversaries infer sensitive user inputs from shared entries, leading…

Scientists have built a variety of covert channels for secretive information transmission with CPU cache and main memory. In this paper, we turn to a lower level in the memory hierarchy, i.e., persistent storage. Most programs store…

The last level cache is vulnerable to timing based side channel attacks because it is shared by the attacker and the victim processes even if they are located on different cores. These timing attacks evict the victim cache lines using small…

Caches on the modern commodity CPUs have become one of the major sources of side-channel leakages and been abused as a new attack vector. To thwart the cache-based side-channel attacks, two types of countermeasures have been proposed:…

As quantum computing advances, quantum circuit simulators serve as critical tools to bridge the current gap caused by limited quantum hardware availability. These simulators are typically deployed on cloud platforms, where users submit…

Timing side channels pose a significant threat to the security and privacy of software applications. We propose an approach for mitigating this problem by decreasing the strength of the side channels as measured by entropy-based objectives,…

Cache side-channel attacks extract secrets by examining how victim software accesses cache. To date, practical attacks on cryptosystems and media libraries are demonstrated under different scenarios, inferring secret keys and reconstructing…

For a distributed last-level cache (LLC) in a large multicore chip, the access time to one LLC bank can significantly differ from that to another due to the difference in physical distance. In this paper, we successfully demonstrated a new…

Although cryptographic algorithms may be mathematically secure, it is often possible to leak secret information from the implementation of the algorithms. Timing and power side-channel vulnerabilities are some of the most widely considered…

We introduce the first microarchitectural side channel attacks that leverage contention on the CPU ring interconnect. There are two challenges that make it uniquely difficult to exploit this channel. First, little is known about the ring…

Traditional side-channels take advantage of secrets being used as inputs to unsafe instructions, used for memory accesses, or used in control flow decisions. Constant-time programming, which restricts such code patterns, has been widely…

Side-channel attacks pose significant challenges to the security of embedded systems, often allowing attackers to circumvent encryption algorithms in minutes compared to the trillions of years required for brute-force attacks. To mitigate…

Quantum key distribution protocols are known to be vulnerable against a side channel attack that exploits the time difference in detector responses used to obtain key bits. The recommended solution against this timing side channel attack is…