Related papers: Expectations, Networks, and Conventions
Although both data availability and the demand for accurate forecasts are increasing, collaboration between stakeholders is often constrained by data ownership and competitive interests. In contrast to recent proposals within cooperative…
Prediction markets are widely treated as forecasting devices that reveal collective expectations about uncertain futures. This article argues that under specifiable conditions they also function as coordination mechanisms: public…
An interaction system has a finite set of agents that interact pairwise, depending on the current state of the system. Symmetric decomposition of the matrix of interaction coefficients yields the representation of states by self-adjoint…
The combination of the Bayesian game and learning has a rich history, with the idea of controlling a single agent in a system composed of multiple agents with unknown behaviors given a set of types, each specifying a possible behavior for…
We consider a network of agents. Associated with each agent are her covariate and outcome. Agents influence each other's outcomes according to a certain connection/influence structure. A subset of the agents participate on a platform, and…
We study the competition for partners in two-sided matching markets with heterogeneous agent preferences, with a focus on how the equilibrium outcomes depend on the connectivity in the market. We model random partially connected markets,…
We propose a relaxation of common belief called factional belief that is suitable for the analysis of strategic coordination on social networks. We show how this definition can be used to analyze revolt games on general graphs, including by…
Groups of humans are often able to find ways to cooperate with one another in complex, temporally extended social dilemmas. Models based on behavioral economics are only able to explain this phenomenon for unrealistic stateless matrix…
We analyze an extended model of the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma where agents decide to play based on the data from their limited memory or recommendations. The cooperators can decide whether to play with the matched opponent or not. The…
In competitive resource allocation formulations multiple agents compete over different contests by committing their limited resources in them. For these settings, contest games offer a game-theoretic foundation to analyze how players can…
Coordination is a desirable feature in many multi-agent systems such as robotic and socioeconomic networks. We consider a task allocation problem as a binary networked coordination game over an undirected regular graph. Each agent in the…
Rank aggregation with pairwise comparisons is widely encountered in sociology, politics, economics, psychology, sports, etc . Given the enormous social impact and the consequent incentives, the potential adversary has a strong motivation to…
Mechanisms such as auctions and pricing schemes are utilized to design strategic (noncooperative) games for networked systems. Although the participating players are selfish, these mechanisms ensure that the game outcome is optimal with…
Cooperative MARL often assumes frequent access to global information in a data buffer, such as team rewards or other agents' actions, which is typically unrealistic in decentralized MARL systems due to high communication costs. When…
Different agents need to make a prediction. They observe identical data, but have different models: they predict using different explanatory variables. We study which agent believes they have the best predictive ability -- as measured by…
We propose a Statistical-Mechanics inspired framework for modeling economic systems. Each agent composing the economic system is characterized by a few variables of distinct nature (e.g. saving ratio, expectations, etc.). The agents…
In recent years online social networks have become increasingly prominent in political campaigns and, concurrently, several countries have experienced shock election outcomes. This paper proposes a model that links these two phenomena. In…
The long-standing unitary-actor assumption in strategy research -- treating firms as monolithic entities with coherent preferences -- misses that organizations are coalitions of individuals with diverse and often conflicting goals. Although…
This paper investigates the dynamics of noncooperative interactions between artificial intelligence agents and human decision-makers in strategic environments. In particular, motivated by extensive literature in behavioral Economics, human…
We review and conceptualize recent advances in causal inference under network interference, drawing on a complex and diverse body of work that ranges from causal inference, statistical network analysis, economics, the health sciences, and…