Related papers: Expectations, Networks, and Conventions
Human beings like to believe they are in control of their destiny. This ubiquitous trait seems to increase motivation and persistence, and is probably evolutionarily adaptive. But how good really is our ability to control? How successful is…
We consider the problem of belief aggregation: given a group of individual agents with probabilistic beliefs over a set of uncertain events, formulate a sensible consensus or aggregate probability distribution over these events. Researchers…
Cooperative game theory has diverse applications in contemporary artificial intelligence, including domains like interpretable machine learning, resource allocation, and collaborative decision-making. However, specifying a cooperative game…
Considering some predictive mechanisms, we show that ultrafast average-consensus can be achieved in networks of interconnected agents. More specifically, by predicting the dynamics of the network several steps ahead and using this…
In this paper we extend the series of our studies on the properties of an interacting particle model for market microstructure. In our earlier work we defined a Markov process on the majority opinion of the agents, obtained the transition…
In this work, we are interested in finding the most efficient use of a budget to promote an opinion by paying agents within a group to supplant their true opinions. We model opinions as continuous scalars ranging from 0 to 1 with 1 (0)…
Game-theoretic upper expectations are joint (global) probability models that mathematically describe the behaviour of uncertain processes in terms of supermartingales; capital processes corresponding to available betting strategies.…
We study which outcomes are implementable by disclosing coarse statistics of a data-generating process rather than its full distribution. Players observe data whose joint distribution is only partially known: they know the expectations of…
A growing trend for information technology is to not just react to changes, but anticipate them as much as possible. This paradigm made modern solutions, such as recommendation systems, a ubiquitous presence in today's digital transactions.…
When networked systems of autonomous agents carry out complex tasks, the control and coordination sought after generally depend on a few fundamental control primitives. Chief among these primitives is consensus, where agents are to converge…
We study the informational efficiency of a market with a single traded asset. The price initially differs from the fundamental value, about which the agents have noisy private information (which is, on average, correct). A fraction of…
We study a setting where Bayesian agents with a common prior have private information related to an event's outcome and sequentially make public announcements relating to their information. Our main result shows that when agents' private…
We address the practical problems of estimating the information relations that characterize large networks. Building on methods developed for analysis of the neural code, we show that reliable estimates of mutual information can be obtained…
We consider network aggregative games to model and study multi-agent populations in which each rational agent is influenced by the aggregate behavior of its neighbors, as specified by an underlying network. Specifically, we examine systems…
Classical game-theoretic models typically assume rational agents, complete information, and common knowledge of payoffs - assumptions that are often violated in real-world MAS characterized by uncertainty, misaligned perceptions, and nested…
Agents often have individual goals which depend on a group's actions. If agents trust a forecast of collective action and adapt strategically, such prediction can influence outcomes non-trivially, resulting in a form of performative…
This paper introduces a systematic methodological framework to design and analyze distributed algorithms for optimization and games over networks. Starting from a centralized method, we identify an aggregation function involving all the…
We propose a game-theoretic framework that incorporates both incomplete information and general ambiguity attitudes on factors external to all players. Our starting point is players' preferences on payoff-distribution vectors, essentially…
This article provides an introduction to event-triggered coordination for multi-agent average consensus. We provide a comprehensive account of the motivations behind the use of event-triggered strategies for consensus, the methods for…
This paper studies opinion dynamics in multilayer (social) networks. Extending a single-layer model, we formulate opinion updates as a synchronous coordination game in which agents minimize a local cost to stay close to their neighbors'…