Related papers: Zero Knowledge Games
Unlike Poker where the action space $\mathcal{A}$ is discrete, differential games in the physical world often have continuous action spaces not amenable to discrete abstraction, rendering no-regret algorithms with…
This paper considers information sharing in a multi-player repeated game. Every round, each player observes a subset of components of a random vector and then takes a control action. The utility earned by each player depends on the full…
Mixed extension has played an important role in game theory, especially in the proof of the existence of Nash equilibria in strategic form games. Mixed extension can be regarded as continuous relaxation of a strategic form game. Recently,…
There are two well-known sufficient conditions for Nash equilibrium in two-player games: mutual knowledge of rationality (MKR) and mutual knowledge of conjectures. MKR assumes that the concept of rationality is mutually known. In contrast,…
This paper investigates mixed strategies in dynamic games with perfect information. We present an example to show that a player may obtain higher payoff by playing mixed strategy. By contrast, the main result of the paper shows that every…
Zero-determinant strategies are a class of strategies in repeated games which unilaterally control payoffs. Zero-determinant strategies have attracted much attention in studies of social dilemma, particularly in the context of evolution of…
This paper studies a Stackelberg game wherein a sender (leader) attempts to shape the information of a less informed receiver (follower) who in turn takes an action that determines the payoff for both players. The sender chooses signals to…
Equilibrium notions for games with unawareness in the literature cannot be interpreted as steady-states of a learning process because players may discover novel actions during play. In this sense, many games with unawareness are…
This work considers two-player zero-sum semi-Markov games with incomplete information on one side and perfect observation. At the beginning, the system selects a game type according to a given probability distribution and informs to Player…
Self-serving, rational agents sometimes cooperate to their mutual benefit. The two-player iterated prisoner's dilemma game is a model for including the emergence of cooperation. It is generally believed that there is no simple ultimatum…
We study Bayesian Persuasion with multiple senders who have access to conditionally independent experiments (and possibly others). Senders have zero-sum preferences over information revealed. We characterize when any set of states can be…
There has been a recent surge of interest in the role of information in strategic interactions. Much of this work seeks to understand how the realized equilibrium of a game is influenced by uncertainty in the environment and the information…
In this paper, $2\times2$ zero-sum games are studied under the following assumptions: $(1)$ One of the players (the leader) commits to choose its actions by sampling a given probability measure (strategy); $(2)$ The leader announces its…
We study the value and the optimal strategies for a two-player zero-sum optimal stopping game with incomplete and asymmetric information. In our Bayesian set-up, the drift of the underlying diffusion process is unknown to one player…
In this paper we investigate a game of optimal stopping with incomplete information. There are two players of which only one is informed about the precise structure of the game. Observing the informed player the uninformed player is given…
Information asymmetry in games enables players with the information advantage to manipulate others' beliefs by strategically revealing information to other players. This work considers a double-sided information asymmetry in a Bayesian…
We propose a general framework for strategic voting when a voter may lack knowledge about other votes or about other voters' knowledge about her own vote. In this setting we define notions of manipulation and equilibrium. We also model…
This paper considers a non-cooperative game in which competing users sharing a frequency-selective interference channel selfishly optimize their power allocation in order to improve their achievable rates. Previously, it was shown that a…
We investigate a two-player zero-sum differential game with asymmetric information on the payoff and without Isaacs condition. The dynamics is an ordinary differential equation parametrised by two controls chosen by the players. Each player…
This paper studies a communication game between an uninformed decision maker and two perfectly informed senders with conflicting interests. Senders can misreport information at a cost that increases with the size of the misrepresentation.…