Related papers: Data-Driven Models of Selfish Routing: Why Price o…
Among the many functions a Smart City must support, transportation dominates in terms of resource consumption, strain on the environment, and frustration of its citizens. We study transportation networks under two different routing…
In this work we propose a macroscopic model for studying routing on networks shared between human-driven and autonomous vehicles that captures the effects of autonomous vehicles forming platoons. We use this to study inefficiency due to…
The congestion pricing is an efficient allocation approach to mediate demand and supply of network resources. Different from the previous pricing using Affine Marginal Cost (AMC), we focus on studying the game between network coding and…
We investigate the price of anarchy (PoA) in non-atomic congestion games when the total demand $T$ gets very large. First results in this direction have recently been obtained by \cite{Colini2016On, Colini2017WINE, Colini2017arxiv} for…
The price of anarchy has become a standard measure of the efficiency of equilibria in games. Most of the literature in this area has focused on establishing worst-case bounds for specific classes of games, such as routing games or more…
Routing games are one of the most successful domains of application of game theory. It is well understood that simple dynamics converge to equilibria, whose performance is nearly optimal regardless of the size of the network or the number…
In congestion games, selfish users behave myopically to crowd to the shortest paths, and the social planner designs mechanisms to regulate such selfish routing through information or payment incentives. However, such mechanism design…
We study a pricing game in multi-hop relay networks where nodes price their services and route their traffic selfishly and strategically. In this game, each node (1) announces pricing functions which specify the payments it demands from its…
Path selection by selfish agents has traditionally been studied by comparing social optima and equilibria in the Wardrop model, i.e., by investigating the Price of Anarchy in selfish routing. In this work, we refine and extend the…
Selfish routing is a central problem in algorithmic game theory, with one of the principal applications being that of routing in road networks. Inspired by the emergence of routing technologies and autonomous driving, we revisit selfish…
This paper examines the behavior of the price of anarchy as a function of the traffic inflow in nonatomic congestion games with multiple origin-destination (O/D) pairs. Empirical studies in real-world networks show that the price of anarchy…
We investigate a traffic assignment problem on a transportation network, considering both the demands of individual drivers and of a large fleet controlled by a central operator (minimizing the fleet's average travel time). We formulate…
We study routing behavior in transportation networks with mixed autonomy, that is, networks in which a fraction of the vehicles on each road are equipped with autonomous capabilities such as adaptive cruise control that enable reduced…
We study selfish routing games where users can choose between regular and priority service for each network edge on their chosen path. Priority users pay an additional fee, but in turn they may travel the edge prior to non-priority users,…
The inefficiency of selfish routing in congested networks is a classical problem in algorithmic game theory, often captured by the Price of Anarchy (i.e., the ratio between the social cost of decentralized decisions and that of a centrally…
In this paper, we study a routing and travel-mode choice problem for mobility systems with a multimodal transportation network as a ``mobility game" with coupled action sets. We develop a game-theoretic framework to study the impact on…
The cost-sharing connection game is a variant of routing games on a network. In this model, given a directed graph with edge costs and edge capacities, each agent wants to construct a path from a source to a sink with low cost. The users…
Routing games are amongst the most studied classes of games. Their two most well-known properties are that learning dynamics converge to equilibria and that all equilibria are approximately optimal. In this work, we perform a stress test…
When many independent users try to route traffic through a network, the flow can easily become suboptimal as a consequence of congestion of the most efficient paths. The degree of this suboptimality is quantified by the so-called "price of…
In this paper, we consider a heterogeneous traffic network with multiple users classes which differ considerably in their path selection objective. In particular, we consider two classes of users: ones who seek to minimize social cost…