Related papers: Computing Ex Ante Coordinated Team-Maxmin Equilibr…
Many real-world applications involve teams of agents that have to coordinate their actions to reach a common goal against potential adversaries. This paper focuses on zero-sum games where a team of players faces an opponent, as is the case,…
Contemporary applications of machine learning in two-team e-sports and the superior expressivity of multi-agent generative adversarial networks raise important and overlooked theoretical questions regarding optimization in two-team games.…
Unlike normal-form games, where correlated equilibria have been studied for more than 45 years, extensive-form correlation is still generally not well understood. Part of the reason for this gap is that the sequential nature of…
Stackelberg equilibrium is a solution concept in two-player games where the leader has commitment rights over the follower. In recent years, it has become a cornerstone of many security applications, including airport patrolling and…
Infinitely repeated games can support cooperative outcomes that are not equilibria in the one-shot game. The idea is to make sure that any gains from deviating will be offset by retaliation in future rounds. However, this model of…
Many real-world scenarios involve teams of agents that have to coordinate their actions to reach a shared goal. We focus on the setting in which a team of agents faces an opponent in a zero-sum, imperfect-information game. Team members can…
Computing Nash equilibrium policies is a central problem in multi-agent reinforcement learning that has received extensive attention both in theory and in practice. However, provable guarantees have been thus far either limited to fully…
A major open question in algorithmic game theory is whether normal-form correlated equilibria (NFCE) can be computed efficiently in succinct games such as extensive-form games [DFF+25,6PR24,FP23,HvS08,VSF08,PR08]. Motivated by this…
Coarse correlation models strategic interactions of rational agents complemented by a correlation device, that is a mediator that can recommend behavior but not enforce it. Despite being a classical concept in the theory of normal-form…
Equilibrium finding in two-player zero-sum games with perfect recall is a well-studied topic that has led to many breakthroughs in computational game theory. This paper aims to generalize such techniques to (timeable) two-player zero-sum…
The combination of self-play and planning has achieved great successes in sequential games, for instance in Chess and Go. However, adapting algorithms such as AlphaZero to simultaneous games poses a new challenge. In these games, missing…
In many real-world scenarios, a team of agents coordinate with each other to compete against an opponent. The challenge of solving this type of game is that the team's joint action space grows exponentially with the number of agents, which…
We study the problem of finding equilibrium strategies in multi-agent games with incomplete payoff information, where the payoff matrices are only known to the players up to some bounded uncertainty sets. In such games, an ex-post…
Game-theoretic techniques and equilibria analysis facilitate the design and verification of competitive systems. While algorithmic complexity of equilibria computation has been extensively studied, practical implementation and application…
Strategic-form min-max game theory examines the existence, multiplicity, selection of equilibria, and the worst-case computational complexity under perfect rationality. However, in many applications, games are drawn from an ensemble, and…
We study a target coverage problem in which a team of sensing agents, operating under limited communication, must collaboratively monitor targets that may be adaptively repositioned by an attacker. We model this interaction as a zero-sum…
This paper presents a technique for approximating, up to any precision, the set of subgame-perfect equilibria (SPE) in discounted repeated games. The process starts with a single hypercube approximation of the set of SPE. Then the initial…
The peculiarity of adversarial team games resides in the asymmetric information available to the team members during the play, which makes the equilibrium computation problem hard even with zero-sum payoffs. The algorithms available in the…
We analyze the problem of computing a correlated equilibrium that optimizes some objective (e.g., social welfare). Papadimitriou and Roughgarden [2008] gave a sufficient condition for the tractability of this problem; however, this…
We characterize exact, and approximate, optimality of games that players can interact with using quantum strategies. In comparison to a previous work of the author, arXiv: 2311.12887, which applied a 2016 framework due to Ostrev for…