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We consider clustering games in which the players are embedded in a network and want to coordinate (or anti-coordinate) their strategy with their neighbors. The goal of a player is to choose a strategy that maximizes her utility given the…
Motivated by recent progress on pricing in the AI literature, we study marketplaces that contain multiple vendors offering identical or similar products and unit-demand buyers with different valuations on these vendors. The objective of…
We propose a real-time nodal pricing mechanism for cost minimization and voltage control in a distribution network with autonomous distributed energy resources and analyze the resulting market using stochastic game theory. Unlike existing…
In this paper we consider strategic cost sharing games with so-called arbitrary sharing based on various combinatorial optimization problems, such as vertex and set cover, facility location, and network design problems. We concentrate on…
We consider the well-studied game-theoretic version of machine scheduling in which jobs correspond to self-interested users and machines correspond to resources. Here each user chooses a machine trying to minimize her own cost, and such…
We investigate a non-cooperative game-theoretic model for the formation of communication networks by selfish agents. Each agent aims for a central position at minimum cost for creating edges. In particular, the general model (Fabrikant et…
Real-time AI services increasingly operate across the device-edge-cloud continuum, where autonomous AI agents generate latency-sensitive workloads, orchestrate multi-stage processing pipelines, and compete for shared resources under policy…
We consider the problem of exploring an unknown tree with a team of $k$ initially colocated mobile agents. Each agent has limited energy and cannot, as a result, traverse more than $B$ edges. The goal is to maximize the number of nodes…
We study Nash equilibria and the price of anarchy in the classic model of Network Creation Games introduced by Fabrikant, Luthra, Maneva, Papadimitriou and Shenker in 2003. This is a selfish network creation model where players correspond…
We study stable matching problems in networks where players are embedded in a social context, and may incorporate friendship relations or altruism into their decisions. Each player is a node in a social network and strives to form a good…
We introduce and analyze greedy equilibria (GE) for the well-known model of selfish network creation by Fabrikant et al.[PODC'03]. GE are interesting for two reasons: (1) they model outcomes found by agents which prefer smooth adaptations…
We investigate several variants of a network creation model: a group of agents builds up a network between them while trying to keep the costs of this network small. The cost function consists of two addends, namely (i) a constant amount…
A central question in algorithmic game theory is to measure the inefficiency (ratio of costs) of Nash equilibria (NE) with respect to socially optimal solutions. The two established metrics used for this purpose are price of anarchy (POA)…
In this paper, a new framework to study weighed networks is introduced. The idea behind this methodology is to consider that each node of the network is an agent that desires to satisfy his/her preferences in an economic sense. Moreover,…
We study a security game over a network played between a $defender$ and $k$ $attackers$. Every attacker chooses, probabilistically, a node of the network to damage. The defender chooses, probabilistically as well, a connected induced…
We experimentally study effort provision and network formation in the linear-quadratic game characterized by positive externality and complementarity of effort choices among network neighbors. We compare experimental outcomes to the…
We study the self-assembly of a complex network of collaborations among self-interested agents. The agents can maintain different levels of cooperation with different partners. Further, they continuously, selectively, and independently…
Network Design problems typically ask for a minimum cost sub-network from a given host network. This classical point-of-view assumes a central authority enforcing the optimum solution. But how should networks be designed to cope with…
We address the challenge of promoting sustainable practices in production forests managed by strategic entities (agents) that harvest agricultural commodities under concession agreements. These entities engage in activities that either…
Network creation games have been extensively studied, both from economists and computer scientists, due to their versatility in modeling individual-based community formation processes, which in turn are the theoretical counterpart of…